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Non-Technical Summary 
The recent wave of bank mergers and acquisitions suggests that bankers around the world are 
attempting to create more lean (cost efficient) and profitable financial institutions by 
reducing overlapping branches, cutting labour costs, exploiting scope economies and 
implementing new technology that may need large scale to be effective. This paper 
investigates whether about 2000 credit institutions across 15 European countries have 
managed to reduce costs since the implementation of the Second Banking Directive of the 
European Union in 1993. It reveals whether there is scope for further restructuring and how 
and where possible economic gains can be achieved. 
A cost frontier, i.e. a function which relates the minimum costs incurred for producing a 
certain mix and level of outputs given the input prices, is estimated using a new econometric 
technique, the Recursive Thick Frontier Approach (RTFA). This method is discussed in more 
detail in Economic and Financial Report, 99/02. It is assumed that the frontier applies at the 
European level, i.e. banks located in any region of the European union can achieve best 
practice as indicated by the frontier, but the cost function discriminates between banks of 
different legal status and allows for shifts in average costs over time. The econometric 
approach allows for deviations from the cost frontier that are due to random effects because 
of measurement errors, unobservable shocks and factors which are beyond the sphere of 
influence of the banks’ management. On the other hand, deviations may also reflect 
inefficiency due to wasted resources as a result of managerial incompetence in controlling 
costs. 
Scale economies, structural changes in average costs due to, for instance, technological 
progress, costs differences between different types of credit institutions and a measure of 
managerial efficiency or so-called X-efficiency are computed on the basis of this cost frontier. 
Measuring scope economies is beyond the scope of this study. In this analysis we adopt the 
idea that differences in efficiency stem from both wasting of resources due to bad 
management and unprofitable acquirement of these resources.  
New empirical evidence regarding the performance of European banks is obtained by 
estimating an augmented Cobb-Douglas model, which allows us to disentangle the effects of 
input prices on average costs from other time-related effects such as technological progress. 
For our sample period this is important as average costs fell about 20% for the overall 
European banking industry just because the average interbank rate, which is used to construct 
the price of the input loanable funds, fell from 8.4% to 4.5%. 
To summarise our results, we find that the cost structure and performance of European banks 
over the period 1993-1997 can be characterised by the following key observations:  
We do not find major economic gains from positive economies of scale for the overall 
European banking industry. The picture becomes slightly different when looking only at the 
saving sector. Our results indicate that cost reductions of about 6% can be achieved for 
savings banks through larger (or, in some cases, smaller) scale. However, increasing returns 
to scale do only exist for firms up to a size of EUR 600 million. The average cost curve is 
clearly U-shaped for saving institutions since the ten largest firms, i.e. with total assets 
exceeding EUR 50 billion, have significantly higher costs than savings banks in the optimal 
size class. For commercial banks the optimal size picture is less transparent, which is 
possibly due to the fact that this group of banks is highly diverse. Some small investment   3
banks that offer a range of products which is substantially different from the average product 
mix, could belong to this group.  
Significant shifts in the cost frontier over time were only detected for saving institutions. The 
drop of about 9 percent in average costs experienced by the best practice savings banks could 
be due to technological innovation but may equally well indicate that these banks have 
reduced their distance to the even more efficient best practice commercial banks by cutting 
costs in other ways. Indeed, different types of credit institutions are operating on different 
average cost levels. For instance, when taking into account the full sample of credit 
institutions, we find that X-efficient commercial banks incur, on average, four per cent lower 
costs per unit of assets than X-efficient savings banks during the sample period. Mortgage 
banks, in their turn, have considerably lower costs than commercial banks.  
From a cost reduction point of view, one may therefore expect that competitive forces will 
eventually trigger restructuring of the European banking sector in the form of de-
mutualisation of savings banks. On the other hand, in contrast to savings banks, mortgage 
banks are considerably different from commercial banks in respect of the financial services 
they offer. It is, thus, very likely that certain types of niche players may flourish while at the 
same time the bulk of the European financial institutions go in the direction of commercial 
banking. 
In contrast with the relatively modest consequences of size, technology and type, large cost 
reductions are possible when managers organise their business in a more efficient manner. 
Our results show that more than 80% of the European banks are not located at their cost 
frontier and that these banks can reduce the cost per unit of assets with more than 16% on 
average. The slimming course of the European banking sector has already led to substantial 
cost cutting across Europe, and X-inefficiency decreased on average by about four percent 
over our sample period. A remarkable result is that bankers in the UK were able to reduce X-
inefficiencies from over 20% to essentially zero in this fairly short time span. Although some 
countries showed rapid improvement in bank performance, in other countries such as Austria, 
France, Germany, and Luxembourg, bankers have yet to start their diet. Therefore, 
considerable differences in cost efficiency still exist across Europe. The most striking outliers 
are the Greek commercial banks. Although Greek bankers also improved, average X-
inefficiency still exceeded 59 per cent in 1997.  
Splitting up the sample into large banks, when their total assets exceeded EUR 10 billion in 
1997, and smaller ones, reveals some additional interesting results. The 200 big banks of our 
sample have around 6 per cent lower X-inefficiency than their 1774 smaller peers. To us this 
result seems somewhat counterintuitive as we would expect that smaller banks are easier to 
manage. Possibly large banks operate in a more competitive environment which forces them 
to be more efficient. Another reason can be that managers of large commercial banks are 
better monitored by shareholders. However, both small and large banks reduced their X-
inefficiency over time. 
Although the European banking industry is at the beginning of a new era with the 
introduction of the Euro, one can only guess about the rapidity at which the necessary 
restructuring will take place. Restrictive labour laws, state ownership and other forms of state 
intervention, cultural and language barriers to cross border banking and the like may limit the 
pace of changes in European banking. However, there is plenty of scope to reduce costs and 
enhance efficiency throughout Europe.   4
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1. Introduction 
The number of studies that evaluate the performance of European banks sink into 
insignificance beside the voluminous literature on US financial institutions. This paper 
partially fills this gap by investigating the cost efficiency of almost 2000 credit institutions 
across 15 European countries. 
On the first of January 1993, the Second Banking Directive (1988) of the European Union 
and a number of the other key EU directives
1 related to the financial service industry were 
implemented. This heralded a new episode of deregulation, standardised capital requirements 
and changes in supervision rules and deposit-guarantee schemes. The single passport and 
mutual recognition have cleared the road for cross-border banking, while the introduction of 
the Euro on the first of January 1999 took away one of the last obstacles for a competitive 
and integrated banking market. The general belief among bankers and academics is that 
competition has significantly increased in this changing European banking environment. 
Indeed, the numerous cases of recent mergers and acquisitions in the financial world would 
indicate that bankers and insurers are trying to reshape their businesses into more profitable 
and lean (cost efficient) institutions in order to face national and global competitive 
pressures. Traditional income streams such as interest margins have dried up, whereas new 
sources of revenues such as brokerage services, investment banking products, risk 
management and portfolio management have become more and more important. Besides 
major changes in the regulatory environment, the banking industry will be further 
modernised by the implementation of new computer technologies.  
Given the broad picture sketched above, one may ask whether the performance of European 
credit institutions over the five years following the implementation of the Second Banking 
Directive has improved. In this paper we evaluate the performance of banks in this period by 
looking at cost efficiency, i.e. whether banks minimise the cost incurred per unit of assets. In 
particular, we analyse how production costs depend on scale economies, managerial 
efficiency (or so-called X-efficiency), technological progress, and the legal status of the 
institutions. For this purpose, we estimate a cost frontier of the minimum costs to produce a 
certain mix and level of outputs given the prices of inputs. 
What kind of questions do we not address? Our model is less suitable to measure economies 
of scope. One of the reasons for this are the restrictions on the substitutability between inputs 
and outputs that are imposed on the functional form of our cost model. Therefore, we refrain 
from predicting what will be the economic gains of universal banking. In recent efficiency 
studies, however, only small increasing economies of scope were detected. See Berger, 
Hunter and Timme (1993), Berger and Humphrey (1997), Berger and Mester (1997), and 
Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1998) for comprehensive surveys on empirical findings 
regarding the existence of scale and scope economies and X-efficiency of financial 
institutions.  
From the duality theorem it follows that the technology of a firm can be described by the 
parameters of the cost function. However, optimising the level of output given the available 
resources does not necessarily lead to profit and revenue maximisation in economies that can 
                                                 
1 Namely, the Money Laundering Directive, the Own Funds Directive, the Solvency Ratio Directive, the 
Consolidated Supervision Directive, and the directive on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes. The Large Exposures 
Directive, the Capital Adequacy Directive and the Investment Services Directive came into force in 1994, 1995 
and 1996 respectively. See, among others, Molyneux et al. (1996).   6
be characterised by, for instance, oligopolistic markets, asymmetric information and risk-
averse individuals. In response to this argument, some recent articles (see, among others, 
Berger and Mester (1997), and Rogers (1998)) consider, besides the traditional cost function, 
also the profit and revenue frontiers and derive from these functions X-efficiency measures. 
Although these studies give useful insights in the differences in profitability of banks, a 
serious problem with these approaches, however, is that market power may obscure the 
efficiency (in terms of productivity) results. In this study we only focus on cost minimisation, 
and leave profit or revenue maximisation aside.
2 
This paper innovates with respect to traditional cost frontier analyses in three distinctive 
ways: 
● First, a new econometric technique is employed to estimate the parameters of the cost 
function. A detailed exposition of the method, the so-called Recursive Thick Frontier 
Approach (RTFA), is given in Wagenvoort and Schure (1999). The traditional econometric 
techniques for frontier models, namely the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA), the Thick 
Frontier Approach (TFA) and the Distribution Free Approach (DFA) (see Aigner, Lovell and 
Schmidt (1977), Berger and Humphrey (1992) and Berger (1993) respectively) have in 
common that they depend on a priori assumptions that are, whether feasible or not, difficult 
to test. Our approach is based on the assertion that if deviations from the frontier of X-
efficient companies are completely random then one must observe for this group of banks 
that the probability of being located either above or below the frontier is equal to one half. 
This hypothesis can be tested for panel data sets but requires sorting of the full sample into a 
group of X-inefficient banks and a group of X-efficient banks. The cost frontier is estimated 
using only the observations of the latter category. 
● Second, we present a method to disentangle the effects of input prices on the average costs 
from other time-related effects such as structural changes caused by innovation in technology 
and deregulation. In other words, we are able to reveal shifts in the cost frontier over time. 
To specify the cost model we choose the Cobb-Douglas function augmented with dummies 
in order to measure differences in average costs due to the time period, the bank’s type (legal 
status) and its size category. In response to the critique that the standard Cobb-Douglas and 
Translog cost functions are too restrictive to accurately measure economies of scale
3 we 
include seven size dummies in the cost function. This way of modelling gives sufficient 
flexibility with respect to economies of scale, and can include a U-shaped average cost curve. 
A discussion of the relative merits of this approach is given in section 3. 
● Third, our data set allows for a more general definition of X-efficiency than obtained in the 
usual studies of this type. In traditional cost studies, X-inefficiencies may appear due to 
wasting of resources. However, differences in performance cannot be caused by inefficient 
acquisition of the inputs, since every bank is assigned a different input price vector, usually 
based on the actual cost incurred. For example, the price of labour is defined as the bank’s 
                                                 
2 An interesting related topic is whether high market concentration or high market shares is a result of better 
performance or whether it reflects monopoly power. This question is especially relevant for public policy 
considerations of anti-trust institutions. In this study we do not test this so-called structure-conduct-
performance relationship (see, among many others, Berger (1995), Goldberg and Rai (1996) and Maudos 
(1998)). 
3 Therefore, recent stochastic cost frontier studies consider the Fourier Flexible functional form (see Altunbas et 
al. (1999), Altunbas, Goddard and Molyneux (1999), and Berger and Mester (1997)).   7
expenses on labour divided by its number of employees. Choosing input prices in this way 
means that they will differ for each bank in the sample. It is thus implicitly assumed that 
banks pay the “right” amount for their inputs which may differ in quality. By contrast, in our 
study we adopt the idea that differences in efficiency stem from both the wasting of resources 
and because managers acquire these resources inefficiently. In particular, input prices are, as 
far as possible, constructed from general price indices (for buildings, financial services, 
wages etc.) instead of the actual expenses of a bank. In our case, input prices are equal for 
different banks in the same country and the same year. 
McAllister and McManus (1993) argue that the traditional way of choosing input prices may 
bring about the economies of scale puzzle
4 since larger firms have better risk diversification 
opportunities and thus lower cost of funding than small firms. These so-called financial scale 
economies will also be revealed by our approach. If larger banks pay less than our 
constructed average price of funds, and thus have lower interest costs, then these banks will 
have lower average costs than small banks and this will eventually show up in our measure of 
economies of scale. In most recent cost studies this effect would remain undiscovered. 
Our results on the efficiency of European banks can be very briefly summarised as follows: 
the reported X-inefficiencies, which are on average between 16% and 20%, dominate by far 
the possible gains from size economies. Although the saving bank sector can reduce the costs 
per unit of assets by roughly 5% by increasing size, significant scale effects are only found 
for small institutions (with total assets up to EUR 600 million). For the overall banking 
industry, economies of scale are negligible with respect to the cost reductions that can be 
achieved by improving the quality of its managers. For the full sample, technological 
progress could not be detected. On the contrary, the average costs of X-efficient saving banks 
were significantly reduced (with 9%) during the sample period 1993-1997, possibly due to 
technological innovation. Substantial differences in X-efficiencies exist across Europe. In 
1997, UK bankers were almost fully efficient, whereas Greek bankers were the most 
inefficient ones with X-inefficiencies exceeding, on average, the 55% level. A striking result 
however is that the cost dispersions in some European countries, i.e. Finland, Ireland, Italy, 
The Netherlands and the UK, were rapidly reduced.  
These empirical findings are in accordance with earlier studies on US financial institutions 
(see, for instance, Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey (1987), McAllister and McManus (1993) 
and the review article of Berger and Humphrey (1997)) but contradict recent results on the 
scale efficiency of both American and European financial institutions. Hughes and Mester 
(1998), and Altunbas and Molyneux (1996) find positive economies of scale for a broader 
range of size classes for American banks and French and Italian banks respectively, including 
banks with total assets above USD 3 billion.
5 
There are various reasons that could explain why size economies were not revealed by our 
study. Hughes and Mester (1998) argue that large banks take more risk due to the financial 
scale economies mentioned above. As a consequence, the quality of the output mix of larger 
banks is of a different nature than the quality of the financial products of small credit 
institutions. Therefore, large banks may incur higher costs per unit of offered financial 
services and thus measures of output quality must be included in the cost model when 
                                                 
4 Empirical studies on US banks in the 1980s and early 1990s do not find large scale economies. 
5 However, Altunbas and Molyneux (1996) do not find significant sale economies for banks above the size of 
USD 100 million in Germany and Spain.    8
assessing efficiency. A closely related argument is that big banks may profit from scope 
economies that could not be revealed by our augmented Cobb-Douglas function.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In the next section we enlarge upon the 
cost frontier methodology by explaining the adopted intermediation approach and discussing 
several problems related to it. Section 3 contains a thorough exposition of our cost model and 
introduces various efficiency measures. The econometric method is briefly explained in 
Section 4, whereas the data sources, variable definitions, and some summary statistics are 
presented in Section 5. Section 6 contains the results, while Section 7 concludes. Finally, 
Appendix A1 and Appendix A2, with detailed information on price data and the tables 
containing the regression results respectively, are attached. 
2. The Method 
When assessing efficiency one can be interested in X-efficiency --i.e. whether banks use their 
available inputs efficiently, scale efficiency --i.e. whether banks produce the right amount of 
outputs, and scope efficiency – i.e. whether banks choose an efficient combination of outputs. 
All types of efficiencies shed light on a different aspect of the production technology of 
banks. As was mentioned in the introduction, this paper addresses X-efficiency and scale 
efficiency. 
Since we study the production technology of banks it seems natural to establish estimates of 
their production function. This, however, immediately leads to a difficulty. A bank normally 
has multiple outputs rather than a single one, so a statistical model of the production function 
would have multiple endogenous variables and is hence difficult to estimate. For this reason 
bank efficiency studies usually focus on the banks’ cost function or profit function. This is a 
valid approach, as, by the Duality Theorem, we know that a cost function summarises all the 
relevant information of a firm’s technology.
6 By concentrating on the cost function we are 
left with only one endogenous variable: total costs. 
By definition a cost function gives the minimum costs to produce a specific set of outputs for 
given input prices. Therefore, when establishing an equation relating total costs to an output 
vector and input prices we can only call this a cost function when assuming that some of the 
banks in the data set indeed minimise costs. In our analysis we make this assumption.
7 
A cost function relates costs to outputs –or production-- and input prices. However, it is not 
at all trivial what is meant by the outputs and inputs of a bank. As an illustration, bank 
efficiency studies have adopted entirely different definitions of the production of a bank. 
Berger and Humphrey (1992) distinguish three approaches to defining bank outputs. For 
instance, the Asset Approach defines the assets of a bank as outputs and the liabilities as 
inputs. The User Cost Approach treats assets or liabilities that increase the value of the 
banking firm as outputs, and the remaining assets and liabilities as inputs. We view the bank 
as a producer of services such as screening projects, monitoring borrowers, enforcing 
contracts, portfolio selection, hedging risks, providing brokerage services, keeping deposits 
and other claims liquid, providing repayment insurance, etc. By defining services as the 
banks’ production implies that we adopt what Berger and Humphrey (1992) call the Value- 
                                                 
6 The Duality Theorem can be found in any standard micro textbook such as for example Varian (1992). 
7 To be more precise we assume this to be true for banks on the efficient frontier (see the next section).   9
Added Approach in defining a bank’s production.
8 All services which are needed to generate 
the value-added are defined as our inputs. For example, man-power and office space are 
inputs as they are needed for the service production of a bank. A detailed description of the 
outputs and input prices we chose in this study can be found in Section 5. 
Measuring the service production of a bank is a problem in itself. How are for example the 
services offered to account holders quantified? Ideally one would like to have data on the 
number of transactions processed, the number of account statements sent to customers and 
the like. Unfortunately these data are not available. And for other outputs, such as the 
‘amount’ of contract enforcement and the ‘amount’ of risk hedged, the problems get even 
worse. In the Value-Added Approach these problems are by-passed by assuming that the 
amount of services produced are proportional to various variables on the balance sheet and 
the profit and loss account. Variables which are recognised to imply service production are 
then used as proxies for the amount of services produced and plugged in the statistical model. 
As an example, loans are considered to be an output because when offering loans, services 
are supplied, such as screening the projects, monitoring borrowers, enforcing contracts, and 
diversifying risks. Another output could be deposits, as deposits imply services such as 
processing of transactions, production of account statements, etc. It is less clear that assets 
such as government bonds are production as normally purchasing government bonds does not 
imply much screening effort or contract enforcement. Some of these assets provide liquidity 
and thus, beside having some output characteristics, are an input in the form of loanable 
funds, though this is not considered here. 
Variables on the balance sheet and profit and loss account often vastly overstate the actual 
flow of services produced. However, this is simply a scaling problem. So the product of the 
amount of loans and its concomitant parameter estimate will still correctly represent the 
contribution of loan services on total costs.  
What is a problem in case of panel data, though, is that the values of certain variables may 
not imply an equal proportion of service production in different years. For example, if 
deposits of a bank in a specific year are twice as high as in the preceding year, this need not 
imply that the amount of deposit services have also doubled. That is, if inflation has been 
substantial, then a deflator must be employed to keep outputs in different years comparable. 
Yet, we do not know of any panel data study that addresses this issue. In this paper we 
attempt to keep outputs in different years comparable by scaling the output variables. The 
details of this and an econometric argument for it are presented in the next section. 
A more fundamental problem with this study, and many other bank efficiency studies, is that 
amounts of certain variables of different banks may not be comparable.
9 Take the example of 
customer loans on the balance sheet. Customer loans are heterogeneous and different banks 
may supply different types of loans which require a different amount of service production. It 
may hence be that, without being inefficient, one bank incurs higher costs per unit of loans. 
As a result, this bank will incorrectly be judged as being inefficient in supplying loans. In our 
study this problem is potentially severe. Namely, as our focus is on the European Union we 
will have to assume that within this area output proxies can be compared. Although the 
                                                 
8 Viewing banks as intermediators of financial services is traditionally called the “intermediation approach” (see 
Sealey and Lindley (1977)). 
9 Mester (1996) attempts to address this problem by including the average volume of non-performing loans as a 
measure for the quality of the loan portfolio.   10
implementation of the Second Banking Directive on 1 January 1993 implied a considerable 
harmonisation of the EU banking laws, it is clear that there are still large structural 
differences between EU member states. We must bear this in mind when interpreting the 
results in section 6. 
3. The Cost Frontier 
3.1 Background 
Cost frontiers for banking industries are usually estimated by regressing the natural logarithm 
of total costs on a particular function with outputs and input prices (or their logs) as its 
arguments: 
         . ) ,..., , ,..., ( ln 1 , 1 , ti tJ t K ti ti t ti p p y y f TC ε + =   (1)
 
In equation (1)  ti TC  represents the total cost of firm i in period t.  K  and  J  represent the 
number of outputs produced by firm i and the number of its inputs, respectively. The amount 
of output of type k  is denoted by  k ti y , ,  K k ,..., 1 = ; the price of input j by tj p ,  J j ,..., 1 = ; and 
the disturbance term by ti ε . 
The functional form of  ) (⋅ t f  is usually chosen to be a second-order Taylor approximation in 
logs of a general cost function, the so-called translog cost function. The translog cost 
function provides a fairly general specification of a bank’s technology. Some recent cost 
frontier studies using a translog cost function are Altunbas and Molyneux (1996), Berger 
(1995), Berger and Hannan (1998), Goldberg and Ray (1996), Lang and Welzel (1996), 
Hughes and Mester (1998), Maudos (1998), Mester (1996), Rogers (1998), and Vander 
Vennet (1996). Other studies choose the Cobb-Douglas function [Cooper (1980), Fanjul and 
Maravall (1985)] or the Fourier Flexible form [Altunbas (1997), DeYoung and Hasan 
(1998)] to model the banks’ technology. A disadvantage of the Cobb-Douglas specification 
with respect to the other two is that it implies a stronger restriction on the set of technologies 
which can be borne out by the data. For example, the elasticity of substitution between inputs 
is restricted to equal one for a Cobb-Douglas specification. Furthermore, it imposes 
restrictions on the substitutability between outputs and it does not allow for U-shaped 
average cost curves. For these reasons, the standard Cobb-Douglas functional form is less 
suitable to measure for instance economies of scope or scale.  
Despite its disadvantages we choose the Cobb-Douglas specification in this study. There are 
two reasons for this choice. First, taking the adjusted R-squared as a measure, the translog 
cost function specification does not better explain our data than the Cobb-Douglas 
specification. Yet, the results of the translog specification are far more difficult to interpret.
10 
Second, due to price changes in the time period which we consider, it appears necessary to 
distinguish between the effect of price developments on costs and other effects such as 
changes in technology. As we will see below we found an appealing solution for this 
problem, but one which is not suitable for the translog specification. 
                                                 
10 As an example, using the translog cost function we obtained one significantly negative price coefficient and 
two which exceeded one.   11
In the remaining part of this section we discuss how the unknown parameters of relationship 
(1) can be consistently estimated. The discussion takes the Cobb-Douglas cost function as 
example but would also apply to other specifications. Then we proceed with explaining how 
to interpret results from the regressions. In particular, we address how technological progress 
could be identified
11, how X-efficiency is measured, and how to determine scale economies. 
For expositional simplicity we take the number of our regressors as those used in our 
regressions, so we have 5 output variables ( 5 = K ), 3 input prices  ) 3 ( = J , 5 time periods 
( 5 = T ) and 4 different types of banks. 
3.2 Specification 
3.2.1 Scaling the outputs.  
A first problem encountered when estimating equation (1) is that the regressors and the error 
term are likely to be dependent. Consequently, standard regression results will be invalid. To 
see this, note that a bank which is operating on a large scale, i.e. with relatively high values 
of the output variables, has in general relatively high costs. In case this bank is inefficient and 
given a certain per unit output inefficiency, it will deviate in absolute terms to a larger extent 
from the efficient frontier than a small inefficient bank. For an inefficient bank, the 
inefficiency component of  ti ε  will depend, among other things, on the bank’s operating 
scale. In other words, the disturbances are not orthogonal to the regressors in model (1) and 
we cannot get consistent estimates without resorting to instrumental variable estimation or 
appropriately scaling the model. We propose to follow the latter solution and suggest scaling 
by dividing the left-hand side and the right-hand side of equation (1) by total assets, which is 
a proxy for size. Scaling has two advantages. First, we fulfil the fundamental orthogonality 
condition referred to above. Second, a cost function requires the outputs to be in physical 
units, rather than nominal values. Without scaling our output proxies are nominal quantities 
which might imply that in different years they are not comparable. Scaling will reduce this 
output measurement problem. 
3.2.2 Economies of Scale.  
There are three reasons for including dummy variables in model (1) for different size classes. 
First, scaling may not necessarily fully solve the problem of non-orthogonality of the error 
terms. Inefficiency may depend on size in a non-linear way. In this case, including size 
dummies further reduces the under-estimation of the unknown parameters in relationship (1). 
Second, by inserting 7 size dummies we allow for a fairly general form of the average cost 
curve that encompasses the U-shaped average cost function. The Cobb-Douglas function 
with size dummies can exhibit decreasing, increasing or constant returns to scale in any 
order. Third, economies of scale can be directly observed from the computed regression 
coefficients associated with the size dummies. In other efficiency studies it is common to 
compute economies of scale by differentiating the cost function.  
                                                 
11 Strictly speaking, we are only able to detect shifts in the cost frontier over time. These shifts over time can 
also have different causes than changes in technology. Examples are regulatory changes, structural 
developments or other factors that determine the optimal cost of a bank, but are not incorporated in the cost 
function.   12
We split our sample of European banks into 8 non-overlapping size groups.
12 For example, 
the size dummy ( 1 s ) for the group of smallest banks is defined according to  1 , 1 = ti s  if  ≤ ti TA  
EUR 100 million, 0 , 1 = ti s  otherwise.  ti TA  are the total assets of bank i in period t. 
3.2.3 Price changes versus changes in the frontier over time.  
In a panel data framework, the functional form  f  must take into account that the frontier 
may change over time due to technological progress, changes in regulation or other structural 
developments. In equation (1) this has been made explicit by adding a subscript t to the 
functional form  f . To allow for these shifts of the efficient frontier we include time 
dummies in our model. Specifically, as we consider a time period of 5 years we include 
4 1= − T  time dummies in regression equation (1). Unfortunately, this gives rise to a 
problem with the interpretation of the estimated parameters. In particular, input prices can 
show general time patterns in which case the time dummies are correlated with the price 
variables. For example, for our data set the price of funds decreased in time whereas the price 
of buildings and labour steadily increased. As a consequence the time dummies will not only 
pick up the effects of technological progress and the like, but also these price changes. 
A solution to this econometric problem is obtained by first regressing each input price on a 
constant and the time dummies. In other words, before estimating model (1) we perform the 
following three auxiliary regressions: 
        , ln 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 tj j j j j j tj dp t t t t p + + + + + = η η η η η   3 ,.., 1 = j   (2)
Here  j j j j j 4 3 2 1 0 , , , , η η η η η  are the unknown parameters of the constant and the four time 
dummies  4 1,..,t t , respectively, and  T t dptj ,.., 1 , =  are the errors. These errors can be 
interpreted as the deviation of the prices from their time pattern in Europe. At first glance  
regression (2) looks strange as the notation suggests that we have five observations and as 
many unknown parameters. However, for each country we have different price observations, 
so that the equation detects a general (EU-15) time pattern in each price. Subscripts 
indicating the relevant price in each country are omitted for notational clarity. Estimation of 
(2) yields:
13 







* ... ln j j j tj tj t t p dp η η η − − − − = ,  3 ,.., 1 = j   (3)
                                                 
12   Group 1: total assets ≤ 100 million ECU 
  Group 2: 100 million ECU < total assets ≤ 300 million ECU 
  Group 3: 300 million ECU < total assets ≤ 600 million ECU 
  Group 4: 600 million ECU < total assets ≤ 1 billion ECU 
  Group 5: 1 billion ECU < total assets ≤ 5 billion ECU 
  Group 6: 5 billion ECU < total assets ≤ 10 billion ECU 
  Group 7: 10 billion ECU < total assets ≤ 50 billion ECU 
  Group 8: 50 billion ECU < total assets. 
In the remainder of the text we will write EUR instead of ECU, although the basket of currencies that 
constitutes the ECU is slightly different from the one that constitutes the Euro. 
13 In the next equation and later sections, parameters with superscript * represent estimated values.   13
 
By construction, the estimated deviations in the prices, after taking into account time effects, 
are orthogonal to the time dummies. Therefore, price effects on total costs can be separated 
from other effects such as technological progress and the like by substituting equation (3) in 
model (1) (see equation (5) below). In the case of the translog cost function, however, the 
number of explanatory variables in the resulting regression equation explodes. As we 
mentioned above this was one consideration for choosing the more restrictive Cobb-Douglas 
specification in this paper. 
3.2.4 Type dummies.  
Different types of banks can have different cost structures. This can be due to the fact that 
different types of banks operate on different market segments which require a more costly or 
less costly treatment of the financial products offered. Also it may be that differences in the 
regulatory environment faced by the various types of banks affect their costs. Finally, some 
types of banks may simply be X-inefficient. In the first two cases it is appropriate to add type 
dummies to the cost frontier. Indeed, in these cases differences in costs are beyond control of 
the managers of the banks and hence have nothing to do with a difference in X-efficiency. In 
the latter case, instead, one should not add type dummies.  
We have chosen to include three type dummies in order to distinguish between four different 
types of banks. Cost differences between the various bank types are thus detected by looking 
at the estimated coefficients of the type dummies in the model. Needless to say, it is up to the 
researcher to judge how the type dummy coefficients are to be interpreted. One can think that 
type differences imply different cost structures for banks. Alternatively one can suspect that 
cost differences between bank types are due to differences in X-efficiency.
14 
3.2.5 The model.  
After scaling total costs and the output variables, and inserting all the dummies introduced 
above, the Cobb-Douglas cost function becomes: 
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3 2 1 4 1 , 7 , 1 3 2 1
5 1
3 2 1 4 1 7 1 3 2 1
5 , 1 ,
0 ... ... ...   (4)
 
In equation (4),  i i d d 3 1 ,..,  are the values of the type dummies of bank i. Let 
) , , , ,.., , ,..., , , , , ,.., , ( 3 2 1 4 1 7 1 3 2 1 5 1 0 γ γ γ δ δ σ σ α α α β β γ = w  be the vector of parameters to be 
estimated. Under the null hypothesis of no economies of scale, no technological innovation 
or other structural changes and equal cost structures across different types of institutions the 
parameters ) ,.., , ,.., , ,.., ( 3 1 4 1 7 1 γ γ δ δ σ σ are all equal to one. 
                                                 
14 Besides economic considerations, there are two econometric arguments for putting in type dummies. First, in 
the presence of substantial efficiency differences between the various types of banks, the number of banks on 
the cost frontier might become too small to generate reliable parameter estimates. Second, if it were the case 
that X-efficiency and types are correlated then by omitting type dummies we obtain significant correlations 
between the error term and the regressors (assuming that different types of banks have a different output mix). 
This invalidates the regression results.   14
Taking logs of both sides of equation (4) and using the equations in (3) gives
15: 
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01 0 ln α η α η α η γ + + + = c   (6)
        () , ln k k σ κ =   7 ) 1 ( ,..., 1 = − = K k   (7)
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21 2 2 ln α η α η α η δ λ + + + =   (9)






31 3 3 ln α η α η α η δ λ + + + =   (10)






41 4 4 ln α η α η α η δ λ + + + =   (11)
        () , ln l l γ π =   3 ,..., 1 = l   (12)
        ti η  is the new error term.  (13)
 
For each cost function the sum of the input price elasticities, or  j α  in the model, equals unity. 
We therefore estimate model (5) under the restriction: 





j α   (14)
 
The parameters of interest given by vector w can be reconstructed using relationships (6)-
(12) once the parameter estimates of the regression models (3) and (5) are obtained. 
Computing the variances of the parameters of interest sometimes causes more difficulties. 
For the parameter estimates of the type dummies, 
*
j γ , exact standard errors can be computed 
since ) exp( l π  is log-normally distributed if  l π  is normally distributed.
16 However, in the 
case of the estimates of the constant, 
*
0 γ , and the time dummies, 
*
t δ , standard errors can only 
be approximated. A way to do this is given in Kmenta (1986, p.487). Let in the next formula 
                                                 
15 The number 1 is added to  ti TC  and  5 ,.., 1 , , = j y j ti  in order to have a well-defined logarithmic function. 
16 Let  ) , ( ~
2 σ µ N x . The variance of a log-normally distributed random variable y=exp(x) equals 
). 1 ) )(exp( 2 exp( ) var(
2 2 − + = σ σ µ y    15
* α  be a function of K  other estimators  , ,..,
* *




K f β β α = . Then, for large 
samples, the variance of 
* α  can be approximated using a Taylor expansion: 
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0 = j i η η  if  j i ≠  and  0 ) , cov(
* * = ji i η α  for  , 3 , 2 , 1 = i  and  4 ,..., 0 = j .
17 
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3.3 Interpretation and Efficiency 
In the next section it is explained how model (5) under restriction (14) is estimated. Here we 
will address how the estimates of the parameters of interest can be interpreted, and how the 
estimation results can be used to find measures of scale and X-efficiency. 
Parameter estimates for the size dummies, 
*
i σ ,  7 ,..., 1 = i , indicate general cost differences of 
the banks in the respective size class with respect to the banks in the reference class. In 
particular, estimates 
*
i σ , which are significantly smaller (larger) than unity, indicate that, 
accounting for all other aspects incorporated in the model, banks falling in size class i have 
significantly lower (higher) costs per unit of assets than banks in the reference class. 
Likewise, parameter estimates for the time dummies indicate developments of the cost 
frontier over time. An attractive interpretation of this would be technological progress. In our 
study we consider the time period 1993-1997. Then, taking the reference time period to be 
1993, estimates 
*
j δ  which are significantly smaller than unity might indicate that 
technological progress leads to a cost reduction of efficient banks in the sample period. 
Finally, parameter estimates of type dummies,  j d , which are significantly larger (smaller) 
than unity show that efficient banks of the corresponding type have higher (lower) total costs 
over total assets than efficient banks in the benchmark class. 
The regression results give also insight in other aspects concerning the efficiency of the 
banks in the sample. Let us first address X-efficiency, the degree to which banks use their 
                                                 
17 Note that:  
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available resources efficiently. Define 
min
ti TC  to be the estimated cost level of bank i in year 
t if it were on the efficient frontier: 

















A measure for X-efficiency would be given by the fraction  ti ti TC TC
min . X-inefficiency 
represents the distance of a particular firm to the efficient frontier, or 













ineff X   (16)
As was explained in Section 2, efficiency may also differ because some banks do not operate 
at a right size. Let us define  } ,..., , 1 min{ 7 1
min σ σ σ = , i.e. 
min σ  represents the value of the 
size dummy of banks in the size class with minimum costs. Then a useful measure of size-
inefficiency is defined as:  
        .
...
1
















We note that formula (17) is only applied to those banks which are member of a size class 
with significantly higher costs then the optimal size group of banks. If, on the contrary, the 
respective size dummy is not significantly different from the optimal scale dummy, then 
. 0 = − ti ineff S  
4. The Estimation Technique 
Estimating the cost frontier (equation (5)) requires non-standard regression techniques 
instead of OLS or its generalisations. The reason for this is that we look at the minimum cost 
incurred instead of the average costs. One could employ Data Envelopment Analyses (see 
among others Charnes et al. (1994)) in order to find the close fitting frontier which envelops 
all data points. In this case, deviations from the frontier represent inefficiencies by definition. 
On the other hand, in this paper we adopt an estimation method which takes into account that 
deviations from the frontier may emerge due to inefficiency but also due to other temporary 
bank specific reasons (for example, re-organisation costs) or simply bad and good luck. In 
this section we briefly explain why our method is different from other so-called stochastic or 
thick frontier approaches.
18 A thorough exposition of our new method, the so-called 
Recursive Thick Frontier Approach (RTFA), is given in Wagenvoort and Schure (1999).  
A standard technique for stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) was introduced by Aigner, Lovell 
and Schmidt in 1977. This method decomposes the disturbance  ti η  of model (5) into two 
components. One component is assumed to represent the noise term (usually modelled by the 
normal distribution) and the other component reflects the inefficiency part (usually modelled 
by the half-normal or exponential distribution). The Maximum Likelihood procedure is used 
                                                 
18 See, for instance, Berger and Humphrey (1992).   17
to estimate the model. Although it is common in efficiency studies to adopt SFA, it is open to 
three main criticisms. First, it remains unclear how the distributional assumptions can be 
tested. The outcomes of recent efficiency studies crucially depend on these a priori 
distributional assumptions. Second, adding a half-normal or exponential component to the 
disturbances of the regression model does not appear to be an adequate way of treating the 
inefficient banks differently compared to the efficient ones. We find for our sample of banks 
that SFA gives parameter estimates which are close to the OLS estimates. Indeed, the 
regression residuals are approximately normally distributed. This would suggest that all 
deviations from the regression line are due to bad and good luck instead of differences in 
performance. At the same time, one suspects that some banks in the sample are more 
efficient than others since relatively many banks are always located below the regression line 
whereas many other banks are always located above the regression line. It is highly unlikely 
that this can be put down to bad and good luck. Third, SFA is highly sensitive to outlying 
observations. 
The method that we propose is less vulnerable to the criticisms mentioned above. Regarding 
the first two arguments, instead of making the usual distributional assumptions we assume 
that the probability of an efficient bank of being at either side of the cost frontier is equal to 
one half. This assumption can be tested for a selected sample of X-efficient companies. We 
therefore consider a selection criterion that sorts the sample into a group of X-efficient and a 
group of X-inefficient banks. The cost frontier is estimated using only the observations of the 
former group. If this group of banks is still too large, i.e. our test statistic rejects that on 
average the probability for a bank to be above or below the regression line is 0.5, then we 
reduce this group of banks by eliminating those banks which are relatively far positioned 
above the regression line (i.e. banks with relatively high costs). Our method is only suitable 
for panel data. The time dimension of panel data enables to require information on the 
persistence of some banks of having lower cost than others, and this is obviously not 
available when taking into account only single cross-sections. Therefore, we argue that it will 
be always difficult to distinguish between luck or efficiency if only single cross-sections are 
used to estimate the frontier.  
Regarding the third criticism, note that our RTFA approach is less sensitive to outlying 
observations than SFA. First, the parameters of the cost frontier are estimated by considering 
only the observations associated with the X-efficient companies. Outliers in the observations 
associated with the X-inefficient banks thus cannot spoil the cost frontier regression. 
Evidently, outliers may also occur in the group of banks with relatively low costs. We 
therefore employ the one-sided trimmed least squares estimator when estimating model (5) 
for the group of X-efficient banks (see Wagenvoort and Schure (1999) for more details).  
The last point regarding the estimation of the frontier model (5) relates to the representativity 
of our sample of banks. Since our full sample of firms contains relatively many German 
saving banks it could happen that the cost frontier is solely determined by these institutions. 
Our regression results for the full sample of firms reveal that this problem does not occur. 
For the separate regression including only saving banks, however, German saving and 
cooperative institutions put their stamp on the shape of the cost frontier. We therefore 
repeated the regression for a smaller sample of saving banks which included, besides all the 
saving banks in the other EU countries, only 150 German saving banks. The latter ones were 
randomly chosen among 673 German saving institutions. Needless to say, when computing 
size and X-inefficiencies all German saving banks were taken into account.   18
5. The Data 
5.1 Bank Selection 
Our main data source is ‘BankScope’ of Bureau van Dijk, a data set with bank data from 
annual reports and rating agencies. Also we made use of the 1998 edition of ‘Bank 
Profitability’ of the OECD, the International Financial Statistics of the IMF (IFS), 
Datastream International, and the CRONOS data set of Eurostat. Below we will describe how 
we selected our data from BankScope, and how we defined the variables for the cost function 
estimation. 
The focus of our study is on credit institutions, as defined in the two European Economic 
Community (EEC) Council Directives on the “business of credit institutions”. Both these so-
called Banking Directives define a credit institution as “an undertaking whose business is to 
receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own 
account” (First banking Directive, 1977). To translate this in practical BankScope terms, we 
selected “Commercial Banks”, “Savings Banks”, “Cooperative Banks”, “Real 
Estate/Mortgage Banks”, “Medium & Long Term Credit Banks”, and “Non Banking Credit 
Institutions”. We will use the terms ‘banks’ and ‘credit institutions’ interchangeably and they 
will normally refer to the banks we selected in BankScope. 
We took banks in the European Union countries (EU-15) for which yearly data for 1993-
1997 is available. We have focused on this period as on 1 January 1993 the Second Banking 
Directive (1988) came in force implying a large degree of deregulation in the European 
Union. Also relatively many banks are available in BankScope for this period. The bank set 
only includes ‘living banks’. BankScope calls a bank ‘living’ when it continues to exist as a 
legal body.
19 We understand that the focus on living banks implies a sample selection bias. 
Namely, a potential reason why the banking sector may become more efficient over time is 
that inefficient banks die. However, including banks that have died leads to missing 
observations in our sample which are very difficult to deal with econometrically. Of the 
banks that we thus had obtained, we selected all consolidated statements, unconsolidated 
statements, and some so-called aggregate statements.
20 Applying all the selection criteria 
above led to a first group of 2185 banks with data for 5 years. 
We put considerable effort into cleaning this first selection of banks. First, some legal entities 
appeared twice in the data set as BankScope publishes both their consolidated statement and 
their unconsolidated statement. Often this was no problem when the consolidated balance 
sheet contained many more assets --and thus is of a different nature-- than the unconsolidated 
one. However, sometimes the consolidated and the unconsolidated statement looked similar, 
in which case more or less the same balance sheet had entered the first selection twice. In 
order to prevent this we eliminated banks for which the total assets on the unconsolidated 
statements exceeded 70 percent of the total assets on their consolidated balance sheet. We 
also removed banks which report zero or negative interest expenses or operating expenses in  
                                                 
19 So a bank dies when it goes bankrupt or when its activities are brought in another bank. Ownership structure 
has little to do with whether a bank is a living bank. In case of a take-over a bank often continues to exist as a 
legal entity, and therefore remains a living bank. 
20 In BankScope terms, we selected statements with consolidation codes C1, C2, U1, U2 and A1. Aggregated 
Statements are generated by BankScope by adding up the statements of a group of affiliated banks, which, 
however, have no financial links between them, nor form a legal entity.   19
Table 1. Number of credit institutions in the EU-15 analysed in this study 
Country 













Austria  (8.05) 20  21  8  1 50 
Belgium (10.14)  33  19  1  16  69 
Denmark (5.23)  47  28  2  5  82 
Finland (5.11)  5  1  0  1  7 
France (58.15)  171  86  3  35  295 
Germany (81.64)  156  673  49  8  886 
Greece (10.46)  17  0  0  0  17 
Ireland (3.58)  5  0  0  2  7 
Italy (57.29)  57  129  0  8  194 
Luxembourg (0.4)  86  5  1  5  97 
Netherlands (15.45)  28  2  2  3  35 
Portugal (9.9)  18  3  1  2  24 
Spain (39.21)  66  55  1  3  125 
Sweden (8.83)  5  0  5  2  12 
United Kingdom (58.26)  59  3  1  11  74 
EU-15 (371.7)  773  1025  74  102  1974 
Sources: IFS and BankScope. 
one or more years.
21 Third, we removed two banks for which we found that individual 
balance sheet items exceeded the balance sheet totals (erroneous data). Fourth, we left out 
some outlier observations. In particular, we omitted banks reporting an amount of ‘off-
balance sheet items’ of more than twice the balance sheet total, and a bank which reported 
the regular operating and interest expenses to be more than 2½ times the balance sheet total 
in a particular year. While we recognise that the data for these few banks was not necessarily 
wrong, these bank would have formed ‘leverage points’ which could have seriously distorted 
the regression results. 
Table 1 reports the country of origin and the type of the 1974 banks which were left over 
after cleaning the data. In the table we have grouped the banks into four categories: 
Commercial Banks (Commercial), Savings Banks and Cooperative Banks (Savings), Real 
Estate/Mortgage Banks (Mortgage), and Medium & Long Term Credit Banks and Non 
Banking Credit Institutions (Long-term and Non-bank). We will follow this classification 
throughout the rest of the paper. From this table, which fairly well covers the overall 
European banking industry, and Figure 1 it can be seen that the structure of the banking 
sectors of the EU-15 countries varies considerably. In particular, Austria, Germany, Italy and 
Spain have relatively many savings banks (more than 40% of the total). On the other hand, in 
Ireland, Greece, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, less than 10% of the 
credit institutions of our sample are savings banks. Although these numbers slightly change 
when including all banks which reside in Europe, the broad picture holds true for the whole 
European banking sector. For instance, while not in our data set, there are a few savings 
banks in Sweden and Greece. 
                                                 
21Sometimes the data suggest that in a particular year interest expenses may indeed have been zero. In this case 
we left the bank in the sample.   20





























Another striking fact from Table 1 is that Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and, 
last but not least, Luxembourg have relatively many banks. In these countries there are more 
than 5 banks per 1 million of inhabitants whereas the median in Europe is only about 3.2 
banks per 1 million people. 
5.2 Definition of the Variables 
All data for total costs and output comes from Bankscope. The banks’ total costs are defined 
as the sum of ‘interest expense’, ‘total operating expense’ and ‘commission expense’. 
We have defined 5 output variables: customer deposits, loans, equity investments, off-
balance sheet items, and other services. Customer deposits comprise demand, savings and 
time deposits.
22 The variable loans is created by taking ‘total loans’ in BankScope and 
subtracting ‘loans to municipalities / government’ and ‘loans to group companies / 
associates’. The latter two variables are subtracted as we suspect that relatively few actions 
need be undertaken when offering loans to these groups of borrowers and thus these assets do 
not significantly incur additional costs. We share the opinion that mortgages may also imply 
a different amount of services per unit than other loans and therefore should be treated as an 
separate output variable. However, unfortunately for most countries BankScope data does not 
separate mortgages from loans. Equity investments are obtained by adding up ‘equity 
investments’ and ‘other investments’. These items comprise the book value of participations 
and shares in companies with related business and shares in other non-financial affiliates. 
Here we have to remark that in many cases this latter output can be substantially under-
valued since its book value, as taken from Bankscope, is usually determined on the basis of 
historic costs instead of its market value. However, this does not necessarily pose as a 
problem in measuring financial services as long as banks use similar accounting techniques. 
                                                 
22 As we were not sure whether demand and saving deposits on the one hand and time deposits on the other 
represent the same amount of service production per unit, we attempted to create two output variables rather 
than one. Unfortunately, however, the data for German banks do not allow for such an analysis.   21
Evidently, there is a potential danger of mis-measurement of the level of the output variable 
equity investments for our bank set. We have included this variable as we suspect that equity 
investments imply activities such as the selection of the shares and active monitoring and 
risk-management.  Off-balance sheet items correspond to ‘off-balance sheet items’ in 
BankScope which contains contingent liabilities arising from guarantees, irrevocable letters 
of credit, irrevocable facilities, discounted bills, etc. Derivatives are not included in this item. 
Like loans, off-balance sheet items force the bank to screen and monitor projects and hence 
provide services. Finally, the variable other services is equal to the variable ‘commission 
revenue’. In order to keep the commission revenues in different years comparable we divide 
through a price index for banking services.
23 Appendix A1 explains how this price index is 
created. Contrary to all other output variables, which are stock variables on and off the 
balance sheet, other services is a flow variable taken from the profit and loss account. 
In our opinion the remaining earning and non-earning assets on the banks’ balance sheet, 
such as securities, treasury and other bills, bonds, certificates of deposits, cash balances, and 
the like, do not require the provision of a significant amount of services and are hence not 
included in the output vector.
24  
Three input prices have been defined: the price of loanable funds, the price of labour and the 
price of buildings.
25 The price of funds is obtained by taking a weighted average of the 
average 3-month interbank rate and the deposit rate. This data is obtained from Datastream 
International and IFS, respectively. The weights are determined by the amount of deposit 
funding as part of total funding (total assets) of each bank. The price of labour represents the 
average wage rate in the banking sector in each country. The data needed to construct an 
index for the price of labour is taken from BankScope and the OECD. The price of buildings 
is created by taking an appropriate price index for newly delivered buildings and correcting it 
for the relative price levels in each country. A detailed description on these calculations is 
given in the Appendix A1. 
The prices we use are fundamentally different from most other bank efficiency studies. 
Normally the price of funds is defined as the ratio of the interest expenses to the total amount 
of funds. The wage rate is normally taken to equal the labour expenses of the bank over the 
number of its employees. Finally, the price of a unit of capital is normally defined by 
dividing the net expenses for fixed asset by the average value of fixed assets. In other words, 
                                                 
23 Obviously, changes in prices of the other output variables can be relevant too. Unfortunately no adequate data 
on these prices are available. As mentioned in section 3, we minimise this problem by scaling all the output 
variables, including the deflated commission revenue, and total costs by total assets. One could argue that, in 
the special case of the output variable other services, this scaling is redundant since we already divide through a 
price index. Recall however that there is also an econometric argument for it since scaling reduces the problem 
that the model errors are not orthogonal to the regressors in a cost model specification and on that score the 
fundamental orthogonality condition is not fulfilled. Division through price indices cannot solve the latter 
problem. 
24 Adding these items to the output vector and leaving it up to the regression to decide whether they should be 
treated as production leads to invalid regressions. Namely, in this case there will be a strong dependency 
between the output variables since their sum equals the balance sheet total. Even if this were not an 
econometrical problem, it would give problems interpreting the parameter estimates. 
25 The reader could correctly point out that banks face more prices when acquiring their inputs. We think, 
though, that the three prices we have included are the most important input prices. Also, our assumption here is 
not so much that the bank faces only these three prices, but that a linear combination of these can sufficiently 
well approximate the prices that the bank might face. Other bank efficiency studies typically also include up to 
three prices.   22
in other studies the prices faced by a particular bank are usually defined using data on the 
actual expenses of that bank. When these expenses are unnecessarily high this is not 
measured as being inefficient. As a result efficiency differences only stem from differences 
in the production of outputs. 
We recognise that both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. For instance, if 
different banks require different skilled labour then some banks may have on average a 
higher or lower wage bill than others without necessarily being inefficient. Nevertheless, we 
think our approach is more appropriate when studying bank efficiency as we suspect many 
efficiency differences arise exactly because some banks acquire their inputs inefficiently. 
5.3 Some Descriptive Statistics 
We will now present some descriptive statistics on the banks in the data set. Figure 2 shows 
that across Europe there are also considerable differences in the cost levels. Average costs, 
i.e. the ratio of costs over total assets, range for most countries between 4% and 8%. Besides 
the striking outlier of Greece, average costs are also relatively high in France, Italy, 
Luxembourg and Portugal when compared with the EU-15 average (of 6.6% in 1997).
26 In all 
European countries, however, costs per unit of assets substantially decreased. Figure 3 shows 
that for the overall European banking industry, average costs fell about 25% during the 
period 1993-1997. 
It would be premature to conclude from Figure 2 and Figure 3 that Greek banks are more 
inefficient than other European banks or that the performance of European banks has 
improved over time. For testing these kinds of hypotheses we have to take into consideration 
changes in the input prices and changes in the level and mix of the outputs. For example, it is 
notable that the interbank fund rate in 1997, on average, is only 47% of the prevailing rate in 
1993. Indeed, our cost frontier regression (presented in the next section) gives a fund price 
elasticity of about 40% with respect to average costs. This means that average costs of X-
efficient banks decreased with roughly 20% just because the fund rate fell from 8.4% to 
4.5%. Figure 3 to Figure 6 show this relationship between average costs and the fund rate for 
the EU-15, Italy, Germany, and the UK respectively. Evidently, given the sharp fall in the 
price of funds in Europe one may expect substantially lower average costs for banks in 
general. Whether banks have actually improved in efficiency terms can only be detected by 
careful interpretation of the cost frontier regression results. 
Substantial differences across the banking industry are also revealed by looking at the banks’ 
output structure in the respective European countries. Figure 7 shows the decomposition of 
the earning assets. Equity investments are relatively small compared to other earning assets. 
On average, equity investments are less than 2% of total assets, whereas 50% of the balance 
total consists of loans and mortgages. Luxembourg and Greece have relatively many ‘other 
assets’. As mentioned before, these assets, such as treasury and other bills, are not included 
as outputs in our cost model since they do not significantly incur additional costs. In the 
special case of Luxembourg, however, this assumption could be too restrictive. This means 
that the results presented in section 6 have to be interpreted with some caution.  
                                                 
26 The EU-15 averages in figures 1 to 10 are constructed by applying country weights on the basis of the share 
of each country in total European assets.   23



















































































































Three other outputs are included in the cost model: deposits, off- balance sheet activities, and 
services related to other activities (brokerage services). The ratio of deposits over total assets 
also reveals remarkable differences in country output structures (see Figure 8). According to 
the Value-Added Approach adopted in this paper, deposits have output features besides 
providing input in the form of loanable funds. Because the differences in the relative amount 
of deposits are substantial, including this output variable in the cost model is important for a 
fair comparison of banks in different countries. Both the ratio of off-balance sheet items to 
total assets, and the ratio of brokerage services to total assets, reveal two outliers with respect 
to financial product mix. In 1997, Belgium and Swedish banks report relatively high off-
balance sheet activities (see figure 9). Furthermore, brokerage services are relatively high in 
Ireland and the UK (see figure 10). Note that for Greece earned brokerage fees are not 
reported in BankScope. We should bear these facts in mind when discussing the cost 
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6. Empirical Evidence Regarding the Efficiency of European Banking 
We performed separate regressions for the full bank sample, for commercial banks, and the 
sample of savings banks. Due to data limitations we could not perform separate regressions 
for mortgage banks or long-term and non-bank credit institutions. However, before turning to 
the regression results several remarks are in order. The first remark relates to how well our 
Cobb-Douglas specification manages to explain the data. Taking Theil’s adjusted R
2 as our 
measure of fit, we see that the model best explains the data of savings banks. In this case, our 
model explains 81% of the variation of total costs over total assets, compared to 49% and 
38% for the full sample and the commercial banks, respectively. Table A2.3 and Table A2.6 
of Appendix A2 contain the results for the full sample and the commercial banks respectively 
while Table 4 in the main text shows the results for the savings banks. The differences in 
explanatory power might be explained by the fact that savings banks make up a more 
homogeneous group of banks. Besides that the group of commercial banks is more 
heterogeneous, within this category, some banks possibly exploit better economies of scope 
than others, leading to cost differences which the Cobb-Douglas specification is unable to 
detect. 
Based on R
2, it is difficult to judge whether our model explains the data well compared to 
other studies. In recent efficiency studies of banks it is not unusual to report an adjusted R
2 
exceeding 0.95. However, as we have mentioned before, in these studies the regression 
model is not scaled by total assets. Hence, to a considerable extend the high R
2 of these 
models is due to the fact that ‘big’ banks face higher costs. 
Related to the reliability issue of the regression results is how many banks are found to lie on 
the cost frontier. For the full sample we find that 340 out of 1974 credit institutions in Europe 
are on their cost frontier, 173 of which are German.
27 This implies that the cost frontier is 
based on 340*5=1700 observations. From the point of view of degrees of freedom, the 
regression results are thus reliable. 
A second remark is that one should be careful when interpreting our parameter estimates. 
Especially the estimated coefficients of the input prices and the outputs are not necessarily 
the impact on the bank’s average costs of changing the variable in which one is interested 
(i.e. the partial effect). The reason is that some input prices and outputs may be significantly 
cross-correlated.
 28 To give an example, it is likely that both the price of labour and the price 
of buildings are correlated to inflation. The same can be true for some outputs. It may well be 
that the outstanding amount of loans of (commercial) banks is strongly related to their off-
balance sheet activities. 
A related remark is that in such cases insignificant parameter estimates need not imply that 
the impact of the corresponding variable is insignificant. For instance, for commercial banks 
we find that the parameter estimate of the price of labour is not significant in the regression 
which includes the time-dummies. However, this does not necessarily indicate that the price 
of labour is irrelevant to the costs of a bank. A significant correlation between the price of 
labour and the price of buildings may drive this result. 
                                                 
27 Table A2.1 reports exactly how many banks are on the frontier and which are their home countries for the full 
sample, the commercial banks and the savings banks. 
28 If, by contrast to the situation sketched above, a particular variable is little correlated to the remaining 
variables in model (5), the corresponding parameter estimate can be interpreted as an elasticity. This is a 
standard feature of log-linear models.    27
A final remark is made about model reduction. In the cases of the full sample and the group 
of commercial banks, none of the time dummies are significantly different from 1 on the 95 
percent confidence level as can be verified in the tables A2.3 and A2.6. We therefore 
repeated the regressions without including time dummies in model (5). The results of which 
are reported in tables 2 and 3 respectively. The parameter estimates of the complete model 
for the savings banks are shown in Table 4.  
6. 1 Input Prices and Costs 
It becomes immediately clear from Table 2, which gives the estimated cost frontier for the 
full sample of banks, that the most important input price of banks is the price of loanable 
funds. This confirms our impression of a close relationship between costs per asset and the 
price of funds (shown in figures 3 to 6). For the full sample we get a coefficient of 0.43 and 
we believe that this figure can well be interpreted as the fund price elasticity of total costs 
over assets.
29 
We notice from tables 3 and 4 that the costs of commercial banks are more sensitive to 
changes in the fund rate than the costs of savings banks. The price elasticities of loanable 
funds are 0.56 and 0.37 respectively. An explanation for the considerable difference in these 
estimates may be that savings banks rely more on long-term finance than commercial banks 
while our price of funds is based on two short-term rates. 
We conclude with a key point. Given the big impact of the price of funds it is of crucial 
importance to take the correct price for this variable. If a price is taken which is inappropriate 
for a specific country, we will have incorrect estimates for the X-efficiency measures for the 
banks in that country. 
In the full sample the coefficients of the price of labour and the price of buildings are 0.23 
and 0.34 respectively. When splitting up the sample these estimates change substantially. We 
believe this is due to the high correlation between the two prices (they may both be driven by 
inflation). We therefore refrain from any interpretation of these results. 
6.2 Bank Outputs and Costs 
We will first discuss the relationships that we observe between the production of different 
outputs and average costs for the full sample of banks (Table 2). Then we pinpoint some 
differences in output elasticities between commercial and savings banks (Table 3 and Table 
4). 
For the full sample, brokerage and loans are the most important outputs. These explanatory 
variables enter the cost frontier with significant parameter estimates equal to 0.099 and 0.069 
respectively. Although the estimate of deposits over total assets is smaller (0.025), deposits 
do also contribute significantly to explaining the bank’s cost. This confirms our view that 
deposits have output characteristics. Equity investments appear with a positive significant 
coefficient of small magnitude (0.011). 
It is striking that off-balance sheet items enter the regression equation with a significant 
negative coefficient (-0.008). This result is due to a strong positive correlation between loans 
                                                 
29 We did a regression of the price of funds on the other two prices and found that in the sample period there 
was very little correlation between the price of funds and the other two prices.   28
Table 2 The estimated Cobb-Douglas cost frontier for the period 1993–1997, full sample 
 Parameter  Estimate  t-value 
Constant  0.0016* 5.92 
Deposits over Total Assets  0.0248* 9.75 
Loans over Total Assets  0.0693* 20.31 
Equity Investments over Total Assets   0.0114* 7.65 
Off-balance Sheet over Total Assets  -0.0075* -4.91 
Brokerage over Total Assets  0.0993* 26.57 
Price of Funds  0.4256* 46.25 
Price of Labour  0.2345* 9.64 
Price of Buildings  0.3398* 13.79 
Dummy, Total Assets ≤ 100 Million
  ECU  1.0745* 3.42 
Dummy, 100 Million < Total Assets ≤ 300 Million 1.0601* 3.17 
Dummy, 300 Million < Total Assets ≤ 600 Million 1.0147 0.76 
Dummy, 600 Million < Total Assets ≤ 1 Billion  1.0236 1.18 
Dummy, 1 Billion < Total Assets ≤ 5 Billion
  1.0248 1.35 
Dummy, 10 Billion < Total Assets ≤ 50 Billion  1.0614* 2.70 
Dummy, 50 Billion  < Total Assets  1.0436 1.71 
Dummy Commercial Banks  0.9620* -4.63 
Dummy Mortgage Banks  0.8052* -6.25 
Dummy M-LT & NB Credit Institutions  0.7958* -8.19 
    
Adjusted Coefficient of Determination  0.44   
Binomial Test  3.73   
Number of banks on the cost frontier  321   
 
Notes: 
(1) The regressand is ‘total costs over assets’.  
(2) Brokerage is scaled by the annual average index of the price of banking services in the  
respective countries.  
(3) Type dummies are defined with respect to savings and cooperative banks. 
(4) Time dummies are defined with respect to the year 1993. 
(5) Size dummies are defined with respect to the class: 5 Billion < Total Assets ≤ 10
 Billion ECU. 
(6) We have adopted the RTFA method. The “Binomial Test” statistic asymptotically converges to a Chi-
squared distribution with one degree of freedom. 
(7) The price of funds is computed as the weighted average (according to the relative amount of deposits in total 
assets) of the (yearly average of the) 3-months LIBOR and the deposit rate. 
(8)  , 63 . 6 ) 1 (
2
01 . 0 = χ  and  . 96 . 1 ) ( 025 . 0 = ∞ t  Significant parameters at the 95% confidence level are marked 
with an asterisk. 
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Table 3 The estimated Cobb-Douglas cost frontier for the period 1993–1997, 
commercial banks 
 Parameter  Estimate  t-value 
Constant  0.0076* 3.42 
Deposits over Total Assets  0.0045 1.61 
Loans over Total Assets  0.0525* 7.92 
Equity Investments over Total Assets   0.0156* 6.46 
Off-balance Sheet over Total Assets  -0.0154* -6.18 
Brokerage over Total Assets  0.1618* 22.02 
Price of Funds  0.5602* 32.87 
Price of Labour  0.1413* 3.57 
Price of Buildings  0.2985* 7.99 
Dummy, Total Assets ≤ 10
8 (ECU)  0.7748* -7.28 
Dummy, 10
8 < Total Assets ≤ 3*10
8  0.9126* -3.87 
Dummy, 3*10
8 < Total Assets ≤ 6*10
8  0.9412* -2.58 
Dummy, 6*10
8 < Total Assets ≤ 10
9  1.0119 0.46 
Dummy, 0.5*10
10 < Total Assets ≤ 10
10  0.9013* -3.10 
Dummy, 10
10 < Total Assets ≤ 0.5*10
11  1.1015* 4.21 
Dummy, 0.5*10
11 < Total Assets  0.9798 -0.76 
    
Adjusted Coefficient of Determination  0.43   
Binomial Test  5.10   
Number of banks on the cost frontier  143   
 
Notes:  
(1) The regressand is ‘total costs over assets’.  
(2) Brokerage is scaled by the annual average index of the price of banking services in the  
respective countries.  
(3) Type dummies are defined with respect to savings and cooperative banks. 
(4) Time dummies are defined with respect to the year 1993. 
(5) Size dummies are defined with respect to the class: 1 billion < Total Assets ≤ 5 billion. 
(6) We have adopted the RTFA method. The “Binomial Test” statistic asymptotically converges to a Chi-
squared distribution with one degree of freedom. 
(7) The price of funds is computed as the weighted average (according to the relative amount of deposits in total 
assets) of the (yearly average of the) 3-months LIBOR and the deposit rate. 
(8)  , 63 . 6 ) 1 (
2
01 . 0 = χ  and  . 96 . 1 ) ( 025 . 0 = ∞ t  Significant parameters at the 95% confidence level are marked 
with an asterisk.   30
Table 4 The estimated Cobb-Douglas cost frontier for the period 1993–1997,  
savings and cooperative banks 
 Parameter  Estimate  t-value 
Constant 7.21E-05*  4.35 
Deposits over Total Assets  0.0299*  4.31 
Loans over Total Assets  0.2119*  21.87 
Equity Investments over Total Assets   0.0090*  4.53 
Off-balance Sheet over Total Assets  -0.0012  -0.87 
Brokerage over Total Assets  0.0369*  9.58 
Price of Funds  0.3718*  27.73 
Price of Labour  0.6355*  20.88 
Price of Buildings  -0.0073  -0.37 
Dummy, Total Assets ≤ 10
8 (ECU) 1.1599*  10.40 
Dummy, 10
8 < Total Assets ≤ 3*10
8  1.0314* 2.73 
Dummy, 3*10
8 < Total Assets ≤ 6*10
8 1.0471* 4.23 
Dummy, 10
9 < Total Assets ≤ 0.5*10
10 1.0168 1.63 
Dummy, 0.5*10
10 < Total Assets ≤ 10
10 1.0015  0.11 
Dummy, 10
10 < Total Assets ≤ 0.5*10
11 1.0130  0.96 
Dummy, 0.5*10
11 < Total Assets  1.1169*  5.97 
Dummy 1997  0.9102*  -2.61 
Dummy 1996  0.9483  -1.45 
Dummy 1995  0.9538  -1.33 
Dummy 1994  0.9819  -0.51 
    
Adjusted Coefficient of Determination  0.81   
Binomial Test  6.53   
Number of banks on the cost frontier  147   
 
Notes: 
(1) The regressand is ‘total costs over assets’.  
(2) Brokerage is scaled by the annual average index of the price of banking services in the  
respective countries.  
(3) Type dummies are defined with respect to savings and cooperative banks. 
(4) Time dummies are defined with respect to the year 1993. 
(5) Size dummies are defined with respect to the class: 6*10
8 < Total Assets ≤ 10
9. 
(6) We have adopted the RTFA method. The “Binomial Test” statistic asymptotically converges to a Chi-
squared distribution with one degree of freedom. 
(7) The price of funds is computed as the weighted average (according to the relative amount of deposits in total 
assets) of the (yearly average of the) 3-months LIBOR and the deposit rate. 
(8)  , 63 . 6 ) 1 (
2
01 . 0 = χ  and  . 96 . 1 ) ( 025 . 0 = ∞ t  Significant parameters at the 95% confidence level are marked 
with an asterisk.   31
and off-balance sheet items. Namely, when loans were left out from the model we found that 
the sign of the coefficient for off-balance sheet items reversed. A possible economic 
explanation for the reported negative coefficient of the off-balance sheet variable could be 
that a bank with many off-balance sheet items incurs less production costs per unit of loans 
relative to other banks. This could be for two reasons. First, the production costs per unit of a 
large loan is probably lower than the production costs of one unit of credit supplied to small 
lenders. Banks with a high level of credit commitments and guarantees are usually larger and 
may also have larger clients. Therefore, they provide loans of larger volume compared to 
banks with few off-balance sheet items. Second, off-balance sheet items contain many credit 
commitments. The loans provided by banks with many off-balance sheet items often stem 
from these credit commitments and these are usually only made to customers with an 
unviolated payment record. This means that the screening and monitoring expenses incurred 
are lower. 
The results regarding the effects of output on cost become interesting once we compare the 
parameter estimates of the separate regressions for commercial and savings banks. The 
positive relationship between brokerage and costs is much more pronounced for commercial 
banks than for savings banks. For commercial banks the parameter estimate for brokerage 
services is 0.162 whereas for savings banks we find a value of 0.04. On the other hand, loans 
are more important for the cost function of a savings bank. For savings banks and 
commercial banks we find significant parameter estimates of 0.212 and 0.053, respectively. 
Finally, the coefficient for deposits is substantially lower for the commercial banks than for 
savings banks and not even significant. All these differences in output elasticities can be 
explained by the fact that commercial banks offer more credit lines and market related 
services such as security trading, risk management, underwriting of assets, etc.  
6.3 Cost Differences Between Different types of Credit Institutions 
The full sample regression results reveal that mortgage banks and long-term and non-bank 
credit institutions operate at significant lower costs than savings banks. In both cases the ratio 
of costs to total assets is about 20% lower than for savings banks. Structural differences 
between different credit institutions may underlie this result. For example, the nature of the 
outputs or the institutional environment of mortgage banks and long-term and non-bank 
credit institutions may fundamentally differ from savings banks. For this reason the cost 
differences mentioned above need not reflect differences in X-inefficiencies. 
Our analysis also suggests that on average commercial banks operate at 4% lower costs than 
savings banks (see Table 2). Again this can be due to differences in structure or X-efficiency. 
For example, a difference in X-efficiency could occur when managers of savings banks have 
more discretion over the use of the bank’s cash-flow. If this were the case, demutualisation of 
savings and cooperative banks would lead to lower costs. 
6.4 Technological Progress 
Has the cost frontier shifted over time in the sample period? In Table A2.3 we see that for the 
full sample the parameter estimates corresponding to time dummies gradually increase over 
time, indicating the opposite. However, none of the t-values of the time dummies are 
significant. We have, therefore, no evidence that the cost level of a typical efficient bank 
changes over time in the period 1993 – 1997. We find the same result for the commercial 
banks [see Table A2.6]. By contrast, we see that costs over assets of an average efficient 
savings bank decreases over time. In particular, for X-efficient banks we find a steady   32
reduction in the costs over total assets of about 2% each year. To be more precise, in the 
period 1993 – 1997 efficient savings banks reduced their costs by 9 percent.
30  
With our limited study we are not in the position to judge what are the driving forces behind 
the drop in costs for savings banks, and why this effect did not occur for commercial banks. 
One can think however of several explanations. As was mentioned above, saving banks are 
on average less efficient than commercial banks. The reduction in the cost per unit of assets 
of the group of managerial efficient savings banks, could simply reflect that these banks have 
reduced their distance to the even more efficient commercial banks. The possible reasons for 
observing such a rise in X-efficiency are numerous. For instance, small saving banks may 
reduce costs by centrally organising the acquisition of funds on the money markets or the 
portfolio management of securities. Within this view, German “sparkassen” provide an 
illustrative example. Cost reductions can possibly also be ascribed to the implementation of 
new (computer) technology that facilitates data processing, data communication with other 
institutions, credit risk evaluation and decision-making. It is not unlikely that savings banks 
were slower in adopting the latest technology in comparison with commercial banks since the 
latter group of banks are usually more market orientated. Commercial banks may have 
started earlier with exploiting new technology in comparison with saving banks, but the 
returns have faded away or were offset by other structural changes. That does not mean that 
technological innovation such as Internet banking will have no impact on commercial banks 
in the future. However, for our sample period, technological progress was statistically 
irrelevant for commercial banks. 
6.5 Size Inefficiencies 
From the parameter estimates of the size dummies in Table 2 we find initially increasing 
returns to scale and afterwards constant returns to scale. The estimates for the size dummies 
initially decrease in the size class. For very large banks the dummy increases again and 
becomes significantly different from unity only for the size class with total assets between 10 
and 50 billion but is insignificant for the largest banks in the sample with total assets above 
50 billion. It therefore seems that only very small banks face higher costs than the reference 
class of banks. In particular, banks with less assets than EUR 100 million have approximately 
7.5 percent higher costs per asset and banks with assets between EUR 100 and 300 million 
have approximately 6.0 percent higher costs per asset. 
Turning to Table 4 for savings banks we clearly find a U-shaped average cost curve. This 
indicates that small savings banks face increasing returns to scale while very large banks 
have decreasing returns to scale. Savings banks with less assets than EUR 100 million have 
approximately 16 percent higher costs per asset than the savings banks falling in the 
reference class. Also the next two smaller size groups have significantly higher costs per 
asset of roughly 3 percent and 5 percent, respectively. After that there are constant average 
costs until we arrived at the ten very large savings banks with total assets exceeding EUR 50 
billion. These banks have roughly 10 percent higher costs over assets than the medium-sized 
reference class. Summarising, small and very large savings banks can improve efficiency by 
choosing their total assets between EUR 600 million and EUR 50 billion. 
For the group of commercial banks the size picture is much less transparent, as costs seem to 
jump up and down with increasing size class. In our view these rather strange results are due 
to the fact that commercial banks form a very diverse group of banks. Some small investment  
                                                 
30 See the value of the 1997 time dummy in Table 4.   33
Table 5 Weighted average of the estimated size inefficiencies in the European Union 
(percentages, number of banks in each country given in parentheses) 
Country 1997  1996  1995  1994  1993 
EU-15  0.03  0.04 0.04 0.05  0.05 
          
Austria (50)  0.02  0.03 0.04 0.05  0.04 
Belgium (69)  0.02  0.02 0.02 0.03  0.03 
Denmark (82)  0.14  0.15 0.16 0.17  0.15 
Finland (7)  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
France (295)  0.01  0.02 0.02 0.02  0.02 
Germany (886)  0.06  0.07 0.08 0.09  0.10 
Greece (17)  0.03  0.01 0.03 0.12  0.12 
Ireland (7)  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Italy (194)  0.02  0.02 0.03 0.03  0.03 
Luxembourg (97)  0.05  0.07 0.06 0.08  0.08 
Netherlands (35)  0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01  0.02 
Portugal (24)  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.01  0.00 
Spain (125)  0.01  0.02 0.02 0.02  0.03 
Sweden (12)  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.01 
United Kingdom (74)  0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01 
Note: This table is derived using the results in Table 2. The weight of each bank is obtained from its total asset 
amount. 
banks that offer a range of products which is substantially different from the average product 
mix, could belong to this group. This could also be taken as evidence that there is scope for 
niche players to play an important role in the banking industry. 
Using the results above we can determine to which extent the banking sector may improve its 
performance by exploiting the increasing returns of scale. The European banking sector as a 
whole hardly would improve efficiency by choosing the right scale of operations as shown in 
Table 5. This is because small banks, although there are more than 800 credit institutions in 
Europe which are smaller than EUR 600 million measured in balance total, account for a 
small fraction of the of the European banking sector’s assets (see Table A2.2). By contrast 
Table 6 shows that savings banks do have scope for improvement. By choosing the right 
scale, savings banks can reduce costs per asset by approximately 6 percent. This empirical 
finding is driven by France and Germany where cost reductions of approximately 8% and 6% 
are attainable.
31 Indeed, most of the European savings banks are based in these two countries 
and many of them are either small or very large. 
                                                 
31 Lang and Welzel (1996) also find moderate size economies for all size classes of German cooperatives using 
1989-1992 data.    34
Table 6 Weighted average of the estimated size inefficiencies in the European Union, 
savings and cooperative banks (percentages, number of banks given in parentheses) 
Country  1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 
EU-15  6.1 6.2 5.9 5.9 5.8 
       
Austria  (21)  1.2 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.5 
Belgium  (19)  5.4 4.8 1.3 4.7 5.1 
Denmark  (28)  3.5 3.5 3.8 4.3 4.1 
France  (86)  8.0 8.1 7.7 7.7 7.8 
Germany  (673)  6.4 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.5 
Italy  (129)  1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 
Luxembourg  (5)  1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Spain  (55)  3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 1.1 
Finland  (1)  1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Greece  (0)  -- -- -- -- -- 
Ireland  (0)  -- -- -- -- -- 
Netherlands  (2)  11.5 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.5 
Portugal  (3)  1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Sweden  (0)  -- -- -- -- -- 
United  Kingdom  (3)  1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Note: This table is derived using results in Table 4. The weight of each bank is obtained from its total asset 
amount. 
Other studies using European data (see, for instance, Altunbas and Molyneux, 1996) tend to 
find positive economies of scale also for larger size classes (in some cases up to a level of 
total assets of EUR 10 billion). Our results are more in line with previous US evidence. 
Hence, in our view, it remains unclear whether there are greater economies of scale in 
Europe than in the US. 
A final remark has to be made for savings banks in countries such as Germany where there is 
a very high degree of cooperation between the, from a legal point of view, independent 
mutual organisations. One could argue that all the small savings banks in Germany constitute 
one large saving institution. Given such an interpretation, measuring scale economies for this 
group of banks makes no sense. Our results would then indicate that relatively small savings 
banks and the ten mega savings banks are much more X-inefficient than the others. 
6.6 X-efficiency 
As we have shown in Section 3 we can construct a measure for X-inefficiency using our 
estimation results of the cost frontier. Basically the X-inefficiency of a particular bank is 
measured by the difference of the realised costs of that bank and the cost frontier. In tables 7, 
8 and 9 we have computed country averages of X-inefficiency in each year for the full 
sample, commercial and savings banks respectively. In constructing these averages we 
weight the X-inefficiencies of a particular bank by its total assets as a percentage of the total   35
Table 7 Weighted average of the estimated X-inefficiencies in the European Union full 
sample (percentages, number of banks in each country given in parentheses) 
Country 1997  1996  1995  1994  1993 
EU-15  16 20  19 19 20 
        
Austria  (50)  11 16  18 14  7 
Belgium  (69)  13 23  18 16 20 
Denmark  (82)  20 25  27 37 32 
Finland  (7)  10 17  11 28 32 
France  (295)  22 21  21 22 22 
Germany  (886)  16 19  14 14 10 
Greece  (17)  59 63  64 67 67 
Ireland  (7)  21 35  33 35 31 
Italy  (194)  14 18  26 22 24 
Luxembourg  (97) 22 20  19 11 20 
Netherlands  (35)  13 24  21 21 28 
Portugal  (24)  30 33  36 36 41 
Spain  (125)  22 24  25 23 29 
Sweden  (12)  28 30  23 35 39 
United Kingdom (74)  -4  8  10  13  20 
Note:This table is derived using the results in Table 2. The weight of each bank is obtained from its total asset 
amount.  
assets of the banks in the respective country. In the same way we also created averages for 
the European Union. In order to reduce the influence of severe outlying observations we 
ignore those banks with X-inefficiencies that are tremendously large or small. This can be 
revealed by means of a (two-sided) trimmed least squares regression of  ti ineff X −  on a 
constant and country dummies. We evaluate whether the absolute value of the standardised 
residuals from this regression exceed the cut-off value 5.
32  
Since inefficiency stemming from the sources discussed above is modest, it is clear that the 
largest cost reductions in the European banking industry can be achieved by improving 
management skills, i.e. by improving X-efficiency. In Table 7 we find that for the full sample 
of banks the average X-inefficiency in the sector is of the order 15-20 percent throughout the 
sample period. This figure is similar to what has been found for the US. Average X-
inefficiencies within the European Union considerably fell from about 20 percent in 1996 to 
16 percent in 1997. There remains, however, plenty of scope for improving the banking 
sector. 
Who are Europe’s efficient bankers? There are some striking differences in X-efficiency in 
Europe that are worth mentioning. These are also illustrated in Figure 11. In the UK, bankers 
were able to reduce their managerial inefficiency from approximately 20 percent in 1993 to 
full X-efficiency in 1997. On the other hand Greek banks appear to be the most inefficiently 
managed in Europe. Although Greek bankers improved, average X-inefficiency still 
exceeded 59 percent in 1997. Like the UK, the Netherlands and Finland show considerable 
gain in X-efficiency in the sample period. Conversely, Austria, France, Germany and 
Luxembourg did not improve over time or even worsened. The other differences we observe  
                                                 
32 We scale the regression residuals by a robust estimate of the standard deviation. For this purpose the Medium 
Absolute Deviation (MAD) estimator is employed (see, among others, Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987), p.45).   36
































































































































are less pronounced and sometimes do not match with the prior views that one may have. For 
example, Sweden is found to have a relatively inefficient banking sector with X-inefficiency 
ranging between 39 percent (1993) and 28 percent (1997). In Italy on the other hand, which 
many think is still at an early stage in restructuring, the banking sector is found to be 
relatively efficient (X-inefficiency fell from 24 percent in 1993 to 14 percent in 1997).  
Although differences in X-efficiency across countries are substantial in many cases, we have 
to be somewhat careful in distinguishing between the performance of banks steering a middle 
course. The variance of the computed X-inefficiencies corresponding to the companies on the 
frontier is quite large. Therefore it may happen that average X-inefficiency even becomes 
negative for a particular country. Managerially efficient banks incur between 10 percent 
higher costs and 14 percent lower costs than the predicted optimal costs at the 95 percent 
confidence interval.
33 The “thickness” of the cost frontier, that is the band around the cost 
function wherein the average cost of X-efficient firms fluctuate, is relatively small in 
comparison with the dispersion of the inefficient banks. These latter banks are highly 
inefficient with an average X-efficiency of 77%. In this case, the corresponding 95% 
confidence interval spans from 57% to 97%. The overlapping part of these two 95% 
confidence intervals indicate a “twilight zone” where banks are close to optimal performance 
but not fully cost efficient. The conclusion that can be drawn from these findings is that 
sometimes X-inefficiencies are extremely high but for other cases there are not enormous 
differences, all things considered. 
Splitting up the sample into commercial banks and savings banks reveals some additional 
interesting results. Looking at the EU averages in tables 8 and 9 it is clear that commercial 
banks have higher average X-inefficiencies (around 13%) than savings banks (around 7 
percent), when each type is compared to its respective cost frontier. Recall from section 6.3 
however that X-efficient savings banks have on average roughly 4 per cent higher costs than 
X-efficient commercial banks. In other words, it is unlikely that savings institutions on 
average are much more efficient than their commercial peers when looking at the cost 
frontier associated with the whole European banking industry. 
                                                 
33 Our estimation method, RTFA, guarantees that X-efficient banks are not systematically located above or 
below the frontier.   37
Table 8 Weighted average of the estimated X-inefficiencies in the European Union, 
commercial banks (percentages, number of banks given in parentheses) 
Country  1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 
EU-15  13 18 14 14 13 
       
Austria (20)  19  25  16  3  -10 
Belgium  (33)  23 33 26 20 20 
Denmark  (47)  -2 2 3 8 4 
Finland (5)  5  12  -2  20  20 
France  (171)  24 23 15 19 16 
Germany  (156)  17 21 14 10  1 
Greece  (17)  66 69 69 69 70 
Ireland  (5)  15 29 23 26 13 
Italy  (57)  14 15 20 18 18 
Luxembourg (86)  26  25  19  8  14 
Netherlands  (28)  17 25 23 22 27 
Portugal  (18)  23 25 26 23 27 
Spain (66)  20  15  10  8  10 
Sweden (5)  1  0  -7  2  9 
United Kingdom (59)  -16  4  3  8  15 
Note:This table is derived using results in Table 3. The weight of each bank is obtained from its total asset 
amount. 
 
Table 9 Weighted average of the estimated X-inefficiencies in the European Union, 
savings and cooperative banks (percentages, number of banks given in parentheses) 
Country  1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 
EU-15  9 6 7 7 7 
       
Austria (21)  8  4  14  11  9 
Belgium  (19)  13 11 15  1  1 
Denmark  (28)  7  13 19 20 27 
France  (86)  13 4 10  11  11 
Germany  (673)  4 4 0 3 -3 
Italy  (129)  6  7 16 8 11 
Luxembourg  (5)  2 6 3 -4  13 
Spain  (55)  21 23 22 24 30 
Finland  (1)  23 23 38 42 53 
Greece  (0)  -- -- -- -- -- 
Ireland  (0)  -- -- -- -- -- 
Netherlands (2)  -1  -1  -1  0  18 
Portugal  (3)  29 29 30 30 36 
Sweden  (0)  -- -- -- -- -- 
United Kingdom (3)  41  36  34  24  33 
Note: This table is derived using results in Table 4. The weight of each bank is obtained from its total asset 
amount.   38
Table 10 Weighted average X-inefficiency of small and large banks (percentages). 
Year Large  Small 
1997  14 20 
1996  18 25 
1995  18 24 
1994  18 24 
1993  19 24 
Note: A bank is defined to be ‘large’ when its total assets in 1997 exceeded ECU 10 billion. Small banks had a 
balance sheet total which was smaller than ECU 10 billion. In our sample there are 200 big banks and 1774 
small ones. 
We also investigated whether there are differences in X-efficiency between small and large 
banks. Here we defined a bank to be ‘large’ when its 1997 total assets amount exceeded EUR 
10 billion. The other banks were defined as ‘small’. In our data set there are 200 big banks 
and 1774 small ones. Table 10 shows that, on average, large banks have around 6 percent 
lower X-inefficiency than small banks. To us this result seems somewhat counterintuitive as 
we would expect that smaller banks are easier to manage. Possibly large banks operate in a 
more competitive environment which forces them to be more efficient. Another reason can 
be that managers of large commercial banks are better monitored by shareholders. It is 
interesting to note that both small and large banks reduced their X-inefficiency over time. 
Conclusion 
This paper investigated economies of scale and efficiency in European banking. For this 
purpose, a cost frontier was estimated. It is assumed that the frontier applies at the European 
level, i.e. banks located in any region of the European union can achieve best practice as 
indicated by the frontier, but the cost function discriminates between banks of different legal 
status and allows for shifts in average costs over time. In comparison with the numerous 
analyses of the performance of American banks, the number of analyses that have considered 
European banking is few. 
New empirical evidence was obtained by estimating an augmented Cobb-Douglas model, 
which allows us to disentangle the effects of input prices on average costs from other time-
related effects such as technological progress. Furthermore, an innovative regression 
technique, the so-called Recursive Thick Frontier Approach, was also used. RTFA sorts the 
full sample into a group of X-efficient banks and a group of X-inefficient banks and proceeds 
with testing whether the banks, which are supposed to be managerial efficient, are randomly 
distributed around the frontier. The advantages of the new method, compared to the 
traditional econometric frontier techniques, are the following: First, the basic underlying 
assumptions of the model can be tested. Second, RTFA is less sensitive to outlying 
observations. However, the number of firms that are relatively close to the frontier must be 
sufficiently large in order to successfully apply this technique. 
To summarise our results, we find that the cost structure and performance of European banks 
over the period 1993-1997 can be characterised by the following key observations:  
The gains from positive economies of scale are “scanty” for the overall European banking 
industry. The picture becomes slightly different when looking only at the saving sector. Our   39
results indicate that cost reductions of about 6% can be achieved for savings banks through 
larger (or, in some cases, smaller) scale. However, increasing returns to scale do only exist 
for firms up to a size of EUR 600 million. The average cost curve is clearly U-shaped for 
saving institutions since the ten largest firms, i.e. with total assets exceeding EUR 50 billion, 
have significantly higher costs than savings banks in the optimal size class. For commercial 
banks the optimal size picture is less transparent, which is possibly due to the fact that this 
group of banks is highly heterogeneous. 
Significant shifts in the cost frontier over time were only detected for saving institutions. The 
drop of about 9 percent in average costs experienced by the best practice savings banks could 
be due to technological innovation but may equally well indicate that these banks have 
reduced their distance to the even more efficient best practice commercial banks by cutting 
costs in other ways. Indeed, different types of credit institutions are operating on different 
average cost levels. For instance, when taking into account the full sample of credit 
institutions, we find that X-efficient commercial banks incur, on average, four per cent lower 
costs per unit of assets than X-efficient savings banks during the sample period. Mortgage 
banks, in their turn, have considerably lower costs than commercial banks.  
From a cost reduction point of view, one may therefore expect that competitive forces will 
eventually trigger restructuring of the European banking sector in the form of de-
mutualisation of savings banks. On the other hand, in contrast to savings banks, mortgage 
banks are considerably different from commercial banks in respect of the financial services 
they offer. It is, thus, very likely that certain types of niche players may flourish while at the 
same time the bulk of the European financial institutions go in the direction of commercial 
banking. 
In contrast with the consequences of size, technology and type, large cost reductions are 
possible when managers organise their business in a more efficient manner. Our results show 
that more than 80% of the European banks are not located at their cost frontier and that these 
banks can reduce the cost per unit of assets with more than 16% on average. The slimming 
course of the European banking sector has already led to substantial cost cutting across 
Europe, and X-inefficiency decreased on average say about four percent over our sample 
period. A remarkable result is that bankers in the UK were able to reduce X-inefficiencies 
from over 20% to essentially zero in this fairly short time span. Although some countries 
showed rapid improvement in bank performance, in other countries such as Austria, France, 
Germany, and Luxembourg, bankers have yet to step on the scales. Therefore, considerable 
differences in cost efficiency still exist across Europe. 
Although the European banking industry is at the beginning of a new era with the 
introduction of the Euro, one can only guess about the rapidity at which the necessary 
restructuring will take place. Restrictive labour laws, state ownership and other forms of state 
interference (promoting national champions etc.), cultural and language barriers to cross 
border banking and the like may set the pace of changes in European banking. However, 
there is plenty of scope to reduce costs and enhance efficiency throughout Europe.   40
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Appendix A1 Price Data 
In the main text we have mentioned three input prices and a price index for banking services. 
In this appendix we give a detailed description of how we created these data. 
The price of funds is obtained by taking a weighted average of the 3-month interbank offered 
rate and the deposit rate. The weight of the deposit rate is taken to be the value of deposits 
over the total amount of liabilities. The weight of the interbank rate is taken to be one minus 
the deposit rate weight. The deposit rates are extracted for each country from the IFS data set 
[Line 60l in the IFS data set of the IMF]. For some countries, we missed data on the last 
quarter in 1997 in which case we constructed the 1997 value to be the average of the rates in 
the first three quarters of 1997. The interbank rate was retrieved from Datastream 
International. We downloaded monthly data on the 3-month interbank offered rates in the 
EU-15 countries and from these we created year averages. The interbank rates which were 
thus created are given in Table A1.1.  
The price of labour was constructed using BankScope data and OECD data. As wages in 
each country differ, we created 15 different wage rates. The 1996 and 1997 observations in 
each country are constructed using BankScope. We added up all labour expenses of all banks 
in the sample in a given country and divided the sum by the number of workers employed by 
these banks. A considerable number of banks report the necessary data. Only in case of 
Ireland we had few banks [in 1996, three banks (out of seven), and in 1997, four]. As 
employment data prior to 1996 is normally not found in BankScope we could not generate 
wage rates for 1993 – 1995 in this way. However, in the 1998 issue of ‘Bank Profitability’ of 
the OECD there is data for 1993 –1996 both on labour expenses in the banking sector, and on 
the total number of employees.
34 With this we had data for the entire period 1993 – 1997, 
with double data for the year 1996. Unfortunately, for a few countries the 1996 values of the 
BankScope calculations differed considerably from the OECD data, and we decided to base 
the price of labour in 1996 and 1997 on the BankScope data. Data for 1993, 1994 and 1995 
was obtained by extrapolating the 1996 observation from BankScope using the OECD data to 
compute changes in the wage rate in the period 1993 – 1996. The results are given in Table 
A1.2. The price of buildings is created by taking a price index for newly delivered buildings 
and correcting it for the relative price levels in each country.  
The data on newly delivered buildings is obtained from the CRONOS data set of Eurostat 
(/theme4/ construc/ isti08a/ i8aa ind, see Table A1.3), and relative price levels are 
constructed from data of CRONOS and the IFS of the IMF. We used Purchasing Power 
Parities (PPPs) with respect to Germany. In WEFA we found exchange rates to the German 
Mark for the EU-15 currencies.
35 In CRONOS we found monthly purchasing power parities 
from Jan 1993 until Nov 1995 (/theme2/ price/ ppa/ ppam). Dividing the exchange rates by 
the PPPs we obtained monthly data on the relative price level in Jan 1993 – Nov 1995. The 
observations from December 1995 onwards could be generated using IFS. In particular, we 
downloaded monthly data on the ‘real effective exchange rate’ (i.e. series reu) for Nov 1995 
– Dec 1997 and used this index to extrapolate the previous data. From the monthly relative 
price levels in the EU-15 we created yearly averages [see Table A1.4]. The relative price  
                                                 
34 That is, for some countries the data is not available for the banking sector as a whole. In that case the OECD 
gives data for the commercial banks (Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden and the UK ) or for commercial 
plus savings banks (Denmark). 
35 These are given by the series L00RF.M; e.g. for the UK (country code is M112) the series was 
‘M112L00RF.M’.   44
Table A1.1 Interbank rates in the EU-15 countries in 1993 – 1997, percentages 
Country Datastream  Code  1993 1994 1995 1996  1997
Austria ASVIB3M(IO) 7.05 5.14 4.57 3.38  3.50
Belgium BIBOR3M(IO)  8.30 5.78 4.85 3.30  3.50
Denmark CIBOR3M(IO)  10.83 6.32 6.13 4.02  3.73
Finland FNIBC3M(IO)  7.81 5.37 5.70 3.63  3.24
France PIBOR3M(IO) 8.76 5.88 6.52 3.95  3.48
Germany FIBOR3M(IO)  7.36 5.40 4.53 3.32  3.33
Greece
a  GDIBK3M(IO) 21.50 30.49 16.46 13.85  14.20
Ireland
b  EIRED3M(IR) 9.56 5.94 6.25 5.41  6.06
Italy
c  ITIBK3M(IO) 10.39 8.57 10.57 8.87  6.89
Luxembourg
d  BIBOR3M(IO) 8.30 5.78 4.85 3.30  3.50
Netherlands HOLIB3M(IO)  6.88 5.20 4.37 3.01 3.32
Portugal
a  LISBO3M(IO) 13.42 11.27 9.90 7.39  5.71
Spain ESMIB3M(IO)  11.88 8.09 9.33 7.58  5.46
Sweden SIBOR3M(IO)  8.88 7.63 8.80 6.04  4.44
United Kingdom  LDNIB3M(IO)  6.04 5.67 6.80 6.18  6.95
Notes: 
a We missed some observations for Portugal and Greece. For Portugal we missed two observations: 31/12/92 
and 31/1/93, so we averaged the other 1993 observations to come to the 1993 rate. Our first Greek observation 
is the 29/04/1994 one, so we missed little more than a year. For the last of these missing observations we found 
a good substitute, the 3 month deposit offered rate in Greece. We established our 1994 average as the average of 
these three observations and the 9 interbank rates we had for 1994. The 1993 average we took to be 21.5 
percent, a rough guess based on extrapolating the three 3 month deposit rates we had for Greece. 
b Datastream has no interbank rates for Ireland, so we took the 3-Month money middle rate 
[EIRED3M(IR)]. 
c Italy’s first 4 monthly observations were taken from the series ‘Italy Atic Interbank 3-month (history) - offered 
rate’. 
d The Luxembourg data series is the same as the Belgium one [BIBOR3M(IO)]. 
levels in Table A1.4 were used to correct the price indices of buildings of Table A1.3 for 
price differences between the EU countries. The price index which resulted from this is the 
price of buildings as used in the study [see Table A1.5]. 
The price index for banking services is obtained from the CRONOS data set of Eurostat. We 
followed the link /theme2 /price /hicp /haind and selected time series hicp_idx, 125a 
(‘banking services n.e.c.’). Unfortunately CRONOS only has data from 1995 onwards, if at 
all. To solve this problem, we took the 1993 and 1994 levels to be equal to the 1995 level. 
The results are given in Table A1.6.   45
Table A1.2 Annual wage rate per employee in ECU in the EU-15 countries,  
1993 – 1997 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Austria 46062  48002 52913 53827 52115
Belgium 54898  56704 58765 60161 60880
Denmark 43418  45000 47797 49986 51744
Finland 29898  32664 33069 37554 35054
France 51956  51591 52848 54946 57509
Germany 43606  44837 48627 49813 52923
Greece 19439  20788 22758 25555 27602
Ireland
a  31696 31696 31696 34384 35350
Italy 55323  54966 50784 59409 58476
Luxembourg 54579  60460 64095 64284 63916
Netherlands 36635  40006 44601 47943 55438
Portugal 27731  27605 30322 32380 33905
Spain 39615  36296 37686 40203 37389
Sweden 39919  40048 46305 53385 55883
United Kingdom  41193  40452 40571 39950 42023
a For the years 1993 and 1994 no data was available. Wages in these years we have assume to be equal to the 
1995 wages. 
Table A1.3 Cost of buildings, price indices for the EU-15 (Source: CRONOS, Eurostat) 
Country CRONOS  Code  1993 1994 1995 1996  1997
Austria Prin_out,  b100 
a  95.2 97.7 100.0 101.7 103.3
Belgium CPI 
f  96.3 98.6 100.0 102.0 103.7
Denmark Prin_inp,  b110 
d  94.5 96.4 100.0 103.1 106.0
Finland Prin_inp,  b100 
c  97.3 98.8 100.0 98.9 101.3
France Prin_out,  b110 
b  99.9 100.1 100.0 101.8 104.2
Germany Prin_out,  b110 
b  95.4 97.6 100.0 99.9 99.3
Greece Prin_out,  b110 
b  87.9 94.4 100.0 106.0 111.5
Ireland Prin_inp,  b900 
e  94.4 96.6 100.0 100.7 104.7
Italy Prin_inp,  b110 
d  94.7 98.1 100.0 101.8 104.3
Luxembourg Prin_out,  b110 
b  97.0 98.2 100.0 100.9 102.4
Netherlands Prin_out,  b110 
b  94.1 96.4 100.0 102.3 106.1
Portugal CPI 
f  91.2 96.0 100.0 103.1 104.9
Spain Prin_inp,  b100 
c  92.3 95.4 100.0 102.8 104.7
Sweden CPI 
f  95.4 97.5 100.0 100.5 101.0
United Kingdom  Prin_out, b110 
b  92.1 95.4 100.0 102.0 107.1
Notes: 
a Output price index of the building sector (national currency) 
b Output price index for residential buildings (national currency) 
c Construction cost index of the building sector (national currency) 
d Construction cost index of residential building (national currency) 
e Construction cost index of building and civil engineering sector (national currency) 
f Consumer price index   46
Table A1.4 Price levels in EU-15 relative to German prices,  
year averages for 1993 – 1997. 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Austria 0.99  1.01 1.02 1.02 1.06
Belgium 0.90  0.91 0.91 0.93 0.96
Denmark 1.16  1.16 1.16 1.20 1.27
Finland
a  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.96
France 0.92  0.91 0.90 0.91 0.94
Germany 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Greece 0.69  0.69 0.69 0.75 0.83
Ireland 0.78  0.77 0.74 0.74 0.76
Italy 0.75  0.73 0.66 0.76 0.84
Luxembourg 0.84  0.85 0.86 0.87 0.90
Netherlands 0.91  0.92 0.92 0.91 0.92
Portugal 0.63  0.62 0.61 0.64 0.67
Spain 0.75  0.72 0.70 0.74 0.78
Sweden
a  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.06 1.07
United Kingdom  0.74  0.74 0.68 0.73 0.95
a For Sweden and Finland we missed data for Jan 1993 - Nov 1995. In these months the relative price levels 
have been taken to be 1. 
Table A1.5 Price index buildings (Germany 1995 = 100) 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Austria 94.5  99.1 101.5 103.5 109.7
Belgium 86.6  89.7 91.0 94.9 99.6
Denmark 109.7  111.7 116.3 123.3 135.2
Finland 97.3  98.8 99.9 93.2 97.1
France 91.4  91.4 89.7 92.5 97.5
Germany 95.4  97.6 100.0 99.9 99.3
Greece 60.7  65.2 68.5 79.1 92.7
Ireland 73.9  74.8 73.8 74.8 79.5
Italy 71.4  71.7 66.0 77.6 87.5
Luxembourg 81.8  83.7 85.5 88.2 92.4
Netherlands 86.0  88.4 91.8 93.5 97.8
Portugal 57.8  59.1 61.1 65.9 70.6
Spain 69.7  68.2 69.9 76.2 81.2
Sweden 95.4  97.5 100.1 106.2 108.3
United Kingdom  67.9  70.4 68.2 74.4 101.3
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Table A1. 6 Price index for banking services (Source: CRONOS, Eurostat) 
Country 1993  1994 1995 1996 1997
Austria
b  100 100 100 100 100.1
Belgium
a  95.5 95.5 95.5 100 100.5
Denmark
a  98.5 98.5 98.5 100 102.8
Finland
a  102.5 102.5 102.5 100 101.1
France
b  100 100 100 100 100.3
Germany
a  97.5 97.5 97.5 100 102.4
Greece
c  100 100 100 100 100
Ireland
a  89.2 89.2 89.2 100 103.8
Italy
a  93.6 93.6 93.6 100 109.9
Luxembourg
a  94 94 94 100 112
Netherlands
a  100.9 100.9 100.9 100 99.7
Portugal
a  94.5 94.5 94.5 100 105.8
Spain
a  97 97 97 100 118.7
Sweden
a  98.1 98.1 98.1 100 114.4
United Kingdom
b  100 100 100 100 101.2
Notes: 
a Missing values in CRONOS for 1993 and 1994. 
b Missing values in CRONOS for 1993, 1994 and 1995. 
c Missing values in CRONOS for all years.   48
Appendix A2 Regression Results 
Table A2.1 The number of banks which are on the cost frontier in the European Union 
Country Full  Sample 
(Concomitant Table A2.3) 
Commercial Banks 
(Concomitant Table A2.6) 
Savings Banks 
(Concomitant Table 4) 
Austria 8  0  8 
Belgium 5  1  5 
Denmark 13  3  5 
Finland 0  0  0 
France 59  23  36 
Germany 173  26  51 
Greece 0  0  -- 
Ireland 1  1  -- 
Italy 32  13  38 
Luxembourg 25  17  3 
Netherlands 3  5  1 
Portugal 1  2  0 
Spain 5  9  0 
Sweden 2  2  -- 
United Kingdom  13  13  0 
 
Table A2.2 Number of observations in each size class for the three regressions 
Size Class  Full Sample 
(9870) 
Commercial Banks  Saving Banks 
Total Assets ≤ 100 million
 (ECU) 569  316  204 
100 million < Total Assets ≤ 300 million
  2013 680  1259 
300 million < Total Assets ≤ 600 million  1551  557  919 
600 million < Total Assets ≤ 1 billion  1197  457  658 
1 billion < Total Assets ≤ 5 billion  2901  980  1649 
5 billion < Total Assets ≤ 10
 billion 638  304  233 
10
 billion < Total Assets ≤ 50 billion  703  348  158 
50 billion < Total Assets  298  223  45 
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Table A2.3 The estimated Cobb-Douglas cost frontier for the period 1993–1997,  
full sample 
 Parameter  Estimate  t-value 
Constant 0.0018*  4.84 
Deposits over Total Assets  0.0065*  3.33 
Loans over Total Assets  0.0782*  24.25 
Equity Investments over Total Assets   0.0099*  6.91 
Off-balance Sheet over Total Assets  -0.0105*  -7.62 
Brokerage over Total Assets  0.0990*  28.44 
Price of Funds  0.5050*  35.38 
Price of Labour  0.2455*  9.18 
Price of Buildings  0.2496*  12.53 
Dummy, Total Assets ≤ 100 Million
  ECU 1.0789*  3.94 
Dummy, 100 Million < Total Assets ≤ 300 Million 1.0650* 3.79 
Dummy, 300 Million < Total Assets ≤ 600 Million 1.0287  1.63 
Dummy, 600 Million < Total Assets ≤ 1 Billion  1.0353  1.93 
Dummy, 1 Billion < Total Assets ≤ 5 Billion
  1.0262 1.59 
Dummy, 10 Billion < Total Assets ≤ 50 Billion  1.0424*  1.99 
Dummy, 50 Billion  < Total Assets  1.0421  1.78 
Dummy Commercial Banks  0.9390  -7.70 
Dummy Mortgage Banks  0.6867  -9.27 
Dummy M-LT & NB Credit Institutions  0.6602  -14.94 
Dummy 1997  1.0706  1.53 
Dummy 1996  1.0887  1.91 
Dummy 1995  1.0171  0.40 
Dummy 1994  1.0320  0.75 
Adjusted Coefficient of Determination  0.49   
Binomial Test  5.96   
Number of banks on the cost frontier  340   
Notes: 
(1) The regressand is ‘total costs over assets’.  
(2) Brokerage is scaled by the annual average index of the price of banking services in the  
respective countries.  
(3) Type dummies are defined with respect to savings and cooperative banks. 
(4) Time dummies are defined with respect to the year 1993. 
(5) Size dummies are defined with respect to the class: 5 Billion < Total Assets ≤ 10
 Billion ECU. 
(6) We have adopted the RTFA method. The “Binomial Test” statistic asymptotically converges to a Chi-
squared distribution with one degree of freedom. 
(7) The price of funds is computed as the weighted average (according to the relative amount of deposits in total 
assets) of the (yearly average of the) 3-months LIBOR and the deposit rate. 
(8)  , 63 . 6 ) 1 (
2
01 . 0 = χ  and  . 96 . 1 ) ( 025 . 0 = ∞ t  Significant parameters at the 95% confidence level are marked 
with an asterisk.   50
Table A2.4 Weighted average of the estimated X-inefficiencies in the European Union 
(percentages, number of banks in each country given in parentheses) 
Country 1997  1996  1995  1994  1993 
EU-15  16 18  20 19 21 
        
Austria  (50)  14 17  23 16  7 
Belgium  (69)  15 24  22 18 21 
Denmark  (82)  21 23  27 36 29 
Finland  (7)  14 18  17 31 34 
France  (295)  23 20  22 23 23 
Germany  (886)  18 19  19 16 13 
Greece  (17)  57 59  62 63 65 
Ireland  (7)  22 35  38 39 33 
Italy  (194)  10 11  23 19 22 
Luxembourg  (97) 23 20  21 12 21 
Netherlands  (35)  14 24  24 22 31 
Portugal  (24)  29 29  35 33 38 
Spain  (125)  20 15  18 18 24 
Sweden  (12)  28 28  22 36 40 
United Kingdom (74)  -4  4  11  14  23 
Note: This table is derived using the results in Table A2.3. The weight of each bank is obtained from its total 
asset amount. 
Table A2.5 Weighted average of the estimated size inefficiencies in the European Union 
(percentages, number of banks in each country given in parentheses) 
Country 1997  1996  1995  1994  1993 
EU-15  0.03  0.04 0.04 0.05  0.05 
          
Austria  (50)  0.02  0.03 0.04 0.05  0.05 
Belgium  (69)  0.02  0.03 0.03 0.04  0.04 
Denmark  (82)  0.15  0.16 0.17 0.18  0.17 
Finland  (7)  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
France  (295)  0.02  0.02 0.02 0.02  0.02 
Germany  (886)  0.06  0.07 0.08 0.10  0.11 
Greece  (17)  0.03  0.02 0.04 0.13  0.13 
Ireland  (7)  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Italy  (194)  0.02  0.03 0.03 0.03  0.03 
Luxembourg  (97)  0.05  0.08 0.07 0.09  0.08 
Netherlands  (35)  0.01  0.02 0.02 0.02  0.02 
Portugal  (24)  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.01  0.00 
Spain  (125)  0.01  0.02 0.02 0.03  0.03 
Sweden  (12)  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.01 
United Kingdom (74)  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Note: This table is derived using the results in Table A2.3. The weight of each bank is obtained from its total 
asset amount.   51
Table A2.6 The estimated Cobb-Douglas cost frontier for the period 1993–1997, 
commercial banks 
 Parameter  Estimate  t-value 
Constant 0.0126*  2.60 
Deposits over Total Assets  0.0095*  2.62 
Loans over Total Assets  0.0454*  5.79 
Equity Investments over Total Assets   0.0140*  4.82 
Off-balance Sheet over Total Assets  -0.0150*  -4.99 
Brokerage over Total Assets  0.1627*  18.51 
Price of Funds  0.6493*  22.81 
Price of Labour  0.0890  1.65 
Price of Buildings  0.2617*  5.30 
Dummy, Total Assets ≤ 10
8 (ECU) 0.7714*  -6.08 
Dummy, 10
8 < Total Assets ≤ 3*10
8  0.9159* -3.13 
Dummy, 3*10
8 < Total Assets ≤ 6*10
8 0.9168*  -2.97 
Dummy, 6*10
8 < Total Assets ≤ 10
9 0.9696  -0.91 
Dummy, 0.5*10
10 < Total Assets ≤ 10
10 0.8966*  -2.91 
Dummy, 10
10 < Total Assets ≤ 0.5*10
11 1.0814* 2.69 
Dummy, 0.5*10
11 < Total Assets  0.9596  -1.26 
Dummy 1997  1.1234  1.36 
Dummy 1996  1.1272  1.41 
Dummy 1995  1.0302  0.37 
Dummy 1994  1.0408  0.50 
    
Adjusted Coefficient of Determination  0.38   
Binomial Test  5.68   
Number of banks on the cost frontier  115   
Notes: 
(1) The regressand is ‘total costs over assets’.  
(2) Brokerage is scaled by the annual average index of the price of banking services in the  
respective countries.  
(3) Type dummies are defined with respect to savings and cooperative banks. 
(4) Time dummies are defined with respect to the year 1993. 
(5) Size dummies are defined with respect to the class: 1 billion < Total Assets ≤ 5 billion. 
(6) We have adopted the RTFA method. The “Binomial Test” statistic asymptotically converges to a Chi-
squared distribution with one degree of freedom. 
(7) The price of funds is computed as the weighted average (according to the relative amount of deposits in total 
assets) of the (yearly average of the) 3-months LIBOR and the deposit rate. 
(8)  , 63 . 6 ) 1 (
2
01 . 0 = χ  and  . 96 . 1 ) ( 025 . 0 = ∞ t  Significant parameters at the 95% confidence level are marked 
with an asterisk.   52
 Table A2.7 Weighted average of the estimated X-inefficiencies in the European Union, 
commercial banks (percentages, number of banks given in parentheses) 
Country  1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 
EU-15  13 18 19 18 18 
       
Austria  (20)  24 29 25 12  1 
Belgium  (33)  26 35 32 25 25 
Denmark (47)  3  5  11  15  10 
Finland  (5)  7 13 4 24  24 
France  (171)  26 23 20 23 21 
Germany  (156)  20 23 21 15  8 
Greece  (17)  62 64 66 65 67 
Ireland  (5)  14 28 28 31 17 
Italy  (57)  12 10 21 20 22 
Luxembourg  (86)  28 26 25 12 19 
Netherlands  (28)  20 27 29 25 33 
Portugal  (18)  19 18 24 19 25 
Spain (66)  17  10  11  7  11 
Sweden (5)  3  1  -3  4  14 
United Kingdom (59)  -19  0  6  12  21 
Note: This table is derived using results in Table A2.6. The weight of each bank is obtained from its total asset 
amount. 